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The gender gap in labor market outcomes (careers’ advancement and wage) has been for decades 
one of the central issues of the economic debate. Although evident and recognized in importance 
and magnitude, authors have suggested different explanations for this gap. Economists have 
supported both supply-side and demand-side explanations. Evidence from both sides confirms that 
many forces and circumstances (discrimination, family constraints, job and individual preferences 
etc.) may concur to keep women away from highly paid jobs and positions. Differences in labor 
market outcomes have been shown to be mainly related with STEM achievements. This confirms 
to be a male-dominated field in which women fail to enter and well-perform with respect to male 
peers. Analogously, for the gender gap in science and math achievements we find demand-side and 
supply-side explanations. Both experimental and nonexperimental literature has widely 
investigated the latter category, in particular individual preferences that could refrain females from 
pursuing STEM careers. In this work we mainly examine the gender gap in competitiveness that 
makes women fail to enter competitive contexts. The distortion of competition occurs also on their 
relative performance. This is confirmed in several studies and experiments. In particular, past 
literature shows that this distortion is mostly related to the math content of submitted tasks. This is 
in line with the evidence of women failing to access and underperforming in STEM fields (then in 
STEM careers), and this, in turn, has a strong and negative impact on women’s labor market 
outcomes. In the literature that we are going to describe several authors find that the distortion of 
competition is weaker when females compete against peers of the same gender. Single-sex contests, 
on the contrary, seem not to have a remarkable effect on men’s performance. Different explanations 
have different policy implications. If females particularly suffer competition against men, policies 
(e.g., quotas) that lead women to compete only against each other, even in male-dominated fields, 
could foster their performance possibly having a long-term impact. In this work we present a field 
experiment run during the Math Olympiad that is an extra-curricular math competition organized 
each year in the Italian high-schools by the Unione Matematica Italiana. In this experiment, that 
took place in the Italian North-East, we analyze the impact of a policy intervention on the gender-
gap in participation and performance. In Chapter 2 we present a literature review. In Chapter 3 and 
4 we respectively describe the experiment, our data sources and variables giving a first look at our 





2. Literature Review 
2.1. The Gender Gap  
Recently women have managed to fill the gap both in educational outcomes and labor market 
participation but gender differences in labor market outcomes still persist (Goldin, Katz and 
Kuziemko, 2006). This disparity is reflected both in wages and career advancements (Flory et al., 
2015) with horizonal and vertical job segregation playing an important role in shaping it (Altonji 
& Blank 1999, Bertrand & Hallock 2001) . This suggests that closing the gender gap in labor 
market participation is not enough to assure equity across genders since the underrepresentation of 
women in top positions testifies that equality of opportunities does not necessarily translate in 
equality of outcomes (Maggian, Montinari and Nicolò, 2017). There are different approaches in 
the recent literature that try to understand these differences in outcomes. The traditional approach 
distinguishes, dividing into these two broad categories, demand-side and supply-side explanations 
(we refer to the review from Azmat and Petrongolo, 2014). 
On the first side, main drivers are discrimination and stereotypes represented as factors causing, in 
particular, job segregation keeping away women from top (and highly paid) jobs and impeding 
them to achieve leading roles in various contexts. In particular, Azmat and Petrongolo (2014) 
specify that “gender discrimination in the labor market is defined as a situation in which equally 
productive men and women are rewarded differently”. Indeed, the crucial point here is that 
discrimination occurs when two or more individuals have the same ability (for example in academic 
career) or the same productivity (in labor markets). The principal force that causes this kind of 
situation are stereotypes based, in this case, on individuals’ gender.  Reuben, Sapienza and Zingales 
(2014) argue that “the stereotype of women’s inferior performance on every mathematics-related 
task […] can lead to a decreased demand for women in STEM fields and/or a reduction in the 
number of women choosing to specialize in these fields”. Most important, in their study this 
stereotype has been found affecting demand for women regardless of their actual abilities and to 
survive even in presence of full information about participants’ past performance. Moreover, 
authors underline the economic relevance of this finding as the stereotype leads to a “suboptimal 
hiring choice”, clearly “biased in favor of men”. Anyway, this demand-side discouragement can 
be an important driver for gender differences in (academic, as we will see, and) labor market 




discrimination) and indirectly when stereotypes are internalized by women negatively affecting 
their performance (phenomenon defined as “stereotype threat” by Spencer et al., 1999). 
 On the other side, there is a branch of the literature that proposes “supply-side explanations”. For 
example, that men and women are different in abilities and that they self-select in jobs due to their 
occupational preferences (Polachek, 1981).  Some authors analyze family constraints, Dessy and 
Djebbari (2010) find that one explanation for within-family imbalances, in terms of outcomes, is 
the failure for men and women to coordinate in the timing of marriage. In the recent literature 
economists have examined new potential factors (still on the supply-side) that can explain the 
unexplained part of the gender gap, harming women’s careers and performance: psychological 
attributes and “individual preferences in the spheres of motivation, ambition and competitiveness” 
(Azmat and Petrongolo, 2014). Before examining this last factor more in detail looking at the past 
literature and then at our evidence, let us understand how the Gender Gap that we have described 
so far is linked to the fact that women and men perform differently in STEM fields. 
2.1.1. Math Performance 
The difference in math achievements manifests itself at different stages. In general, in OECD 
countries the higher propensity for boys to choose math- or science-intensive courses is already 
visible in the secondary school while, for example, in the U.S. this disparity persists at college level 
where “women are significantly less likely than men to graduate with a major in science, 
technology, engineering, or mathematics” (Buser, Niederle and Oosterbeek, 2014). As these 
authors underline, even in environments (for example high schools in the U.S.) where both boys 
and girl are equally likely to choose math-intensive courses and also have similar performance in 
mean, still women are underrepresented among the pool of best or high-achieving students in this 
field although this is not driven by difference in abilities across genders (Ellison and Swanson, 
2010). Gender Gaps in labor market outcomes and in math performance are strictly linked and have 
similar patterns in recent years. As reported in Niederle and Vesterlund (2010), there are several 
studies supporting the evidence that math performance can well predict individuals’ future income. 
Or, at an earlier stage, science achievements can predict college attendance and attainments 
(Goldin, Katz and Kuziemko, 2006).  Due to this important effect that mathematics have on careers 
and wages “differences in mathematics qualifications at the top of the distribution may explain a 
substantial part of the gender gap in income and in career outcomes more broadly” (Joensen and 




and readiness for STEM universities (Card and Payne, 2017). That is why the gap in math 
performance is causing women to be persistently underrepresented in high profitable jobs mainly 
related to STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering and Math) fields, “especially when excluding 
teaching careers” (Carlana, 2019). The same is true when including in STEM fields finance and 
business (Bertrand et al., 2010) . The problem , as we will see in experimental literature and as 
evident from what we have said so far, can be divided into two phases. First, the choice to enter 
math- or science-based courses. Second, once entered this careers, the performance that individuals 
have in this field. For the second aspect, in the recent literature there are several examples of gender 
gap in math performance although this gap is no longer as large as before at the mean of the 
distribution. Women are, in particular, underperforming at the top (Hedges and Nowell, 1995), and 
this is true for various math tests (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2010). There is evidence of women’s 
lower performance also in the experimental literature that then tries to investigate potential 
explanations for this gender difference, we will see in next Sections. As we have said in the 
previous Section, on both sides (so, for what concerns women’s lower probability to choose math 
courses and lower performance) the difference is potentially not only driven, and that is why this 
gender gap is an economic matter, by individuals’ abilities. Joensen and Nielsen (2014) find that 
the underlying ability distribution for both genders in their data is equal “at least around the top 
decile of the distribution”. Nonetheless, among these individuals the percentage of males attending 
math courses is much higher with respect to females. As we have done talking about labor markets 
experience and outcomes, we can similarly investigate (through the literature) potential “demand-
side” and “supply-side” explanations causing females refraining from pursuing STEM careers and 
well-performing in math contexts. Here with “demand-side” we refer to the environment in which 
women grow up and live, while “supply-side” explanations are, as before, females’ preferences.  
For what concerns the “discouragement effect” that we have described in the previous Section in 
the case of labor markets, there is evidence of this effect in family as well as in academic 
environments. Women are exposed to the male-math association since they are young 1 . Beginning 
with gender-biased parents’ expectations about daughters’ and sons’ math abilities (Furnham, 
Revees and Budhani, 2002) clearly in favor of males whose eventual success is considered 
“natural” opposed to women’s results only coming from hard work (Yee and Eccles, 1998). Girls 
suffer both subtle (few models of female mathematicians and scientists) and not-so-subtle (overt-
 




discrimination)  reminders that “math is for boys” and that they do not belong to the STEM world 
during their growth lowering their interest in pursue STEM careers. Subtle situational cues, as the 
low female representation (Murphy, Steele and Gross, 2007) are crucial in this sense. Moreover 
the subtle male-math association becomes heavier the higher is the level of education due to “the 
skewed gender ratio of STEM experts in academic environments” (Stout et al., 2011). Carlana 
(2019) shows “the importance of gender – biased environments in explaining the underconfidence 
of females in STEM fields”. She runs an experiment in Italian schools finding a strong negative 
effect that teachers’ gender stereotypes have on females’ math performance e future academic 
choice, also due to the effect on women’s confidence about their own math ability. From the 
“demand-side” point of view, there is a lot to be done but, at the same time, it is difficult to design 
an efficient short-term policy in order to improve the environment in which females act and 
perform. Still some intervention may help to reduce the problem. Joensen and Nielsen (2014) find 
that a change in high-school curricula and in the way they are organized can foster girls’ tendency 
toward math-intensive courses. In particular, they exploit an exogenous variation in the cost of 
acquiring additional advanced mathematics courses that allows them to demonstrate two things. 
First, that the change in the curriculum flexibility allows students, in particular girls, to follow more 
advanced math-based courses. So, the way in which courses are combined results to be relevant. 
Second, that this has a long term positive effect on involved women’s career, both in terms of 
earnings and career advancement (especially in high paid and male – dominated career tracks). The 
peculiarity of their findings is that this positive effect is asymmetric across genders since men do 
not benefit from this variation, mostly because high-skilled men already choose this kind of courses 
and mid-skilled men do not benefit. In general, due to this exogenous variation, they find evidence 
of the (in the case, causal) effect that additional math courses have on individuals’ career for the 
entire ability distribution. This is important, again, to point out the importance that math 
performance (or in this case, the choice to specialize in this field) has in improving individuals’ 
labor market outcomes and the relevance that has in closing the gap. Although potentially related 
to, or caused by, demand-side factors, other authors investigate supply side explanations. For 
example females’ risk aversion, confidence and competitiveness. We will see in next Sections how 
economists have examined this preferences, in particular the attitude toward competition, its causes 
and consequences. 
As we have argued building this parallel (and, through the evidence from literature, this causal 




factors causing women to underperform in math (or, in general, STEM fields) is an economic 
matter. A pool of (women’s) talent is lost in this scenario, and managing to retrieve this talent is 
“crucial to sustain economic development, growth, productivity and innovation” (Joensen and 
Nielsen, 2014). In general,  gender differences in the labor market have been shown to be 
detrimental from an economic perspective (Galor and Weil, 1996) . 
2.2 Gender Gap and Competition 
A branch of the literature has investigated, in last 20 years, the difference across genders in 
individual preferences and in particular in attitude toward competition. Both the effect of 
competition per se and of competition due to risk aversion, uncertainty, confidence and beliefs 
about relative performance have been investigated. As we are going to see looking at the literature, 
individual preferences can potentially influence both the decision to entry and the performance 
within competitive contexts. The point here is that the distortion of competition can vary by gender, 
then cause gender differences in outcomes (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2010). From the evidence 
emerges that it “could be a relevant trait to explain entry into fields such as sciences and 
mathematics, which are male dominated and viewed as competitive” (Buser, Niederle and 
Oosterbeek, 2014) . Fields that play, as we have argued, an important role in defining the gender 
gap in career advancements and earnings. Moreover, if competitiveness influences individuals’ 
choices during adolescence, this has a potential long-term impact on females’ labor market 
outcomes (Dreber, Von Essen and Ranehill, 2014) relative to males. 
Both experimental and non-experimental literature have studied the effect of preferences on 
individuals’ choice to entry in competitive contexts. Here we describe some important articles. In 
a lab experiment Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) ask participants to choose between a piece-rate 
incentive scheme and a tournament competition (where the relative performance is relevant in order 
to get compensation) in a real effort (and mathematical) task. They find a strong difference between 
males and females, with the latters being less likely to choose competitive environments 
conditional on performance in which they find no gender differences. For this reason self-selection 
in the competitive environment is not explained by maximization of earnings. The negative effect 
of competitiveness results to be robust even controlling for individuals’ beliefs, risk and feedback 
aversion giving the opportunity to the authors to infer a negative effect purely of “taste for 
competition” (in addition to the gender difference in overconfidence whose effect is remarkable), 




imperfection of their controls (Flory, Leibbrandt and List, 2015). Importantly, the difference is also 
driven by males having stronger preference for competition than the predicted one. Similar to these 
authors,  Dreber, Von Essen and Ranehill (2014) find that in mathematical tasks males are as twice 
as likely than females to choose the competitive compensation scheme even controlling for 
performance. To understand the effect of competitiveness, Buser, Niederle and Oosterbeek (2014) 
run the same experiment as Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) in the Netherlands obtaining almost 
the same (hence expected) evidence on females’ and males’ choice about compensation scheme. 
Moreover, they use the standardized measure of competitiveness from this experiment to 
investigate whether this has an effect on educational choices. They also have information about 
participants’ academic performance and perceived math ability. Authors find that, even if similar 
in performance to females, males are more likely to choose more prestigious and math intensive 
academic tracks. This choice positively correlates with the measure of competitiveness that they 
find explaining 20% of this gender gap in educational choice, controlling for the already cited 
measures of ability. The effect of competitiveness is confirmed by Zhang (2013) that similarly uses 
the same standardized measure finding that competitive students are more likely to take entry 
exams conditional on past test scores, although in her study there is no evidence of gender 
difference in preferences. Overconfidence and competitiveness also influence individuals’ earnings 
expectations, potentially having an effect on job sorting and contractual negotiation. This is what 
Reuben et al. (2015) argue finding that these two factors (defined with the experimental measures 
by Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007) positively correlate with expected wages and explain the 18% 
of the gender gap in forecasts. Looking at actual earnings Reuben, Sapienza and Zingales (2015) 
find that, for MBA students involved in their experiment, competitiveness leads to higher wages 
(9% higher for competitive students) and can explain 10% of the realized gender gap in earnings. 
Outside the lab, Flory et al. (2015) run a natural field experiment to analyze job-entry decisions. 
They randomly assign groups of job-seekers to different compensation regimes confirming that 
also in these environments women tend to shy away from competition more than men, even if this 
gender difference in self-selection is driven by males being less averse than females to 
compensation based on relative performance.  
As we have seen many papers find evidence of gender difference in preferences (in particular about 
competition). Once verified the positive correlation that attitude toward competition has with both 
educational choices and job-sorting, these studies demonstrate that the gender gap in 




Now we ask whether different preferences lead to distorted performance in competitive contexts. 
In case competition causes or widens the gender gap in performance, “males will tend to perform 
better than females in jobs that involve competition […] or when competing for promotions and 
advancement within their organizations” (Cotton et al, 2013) and this is relevant for highly paid 
and top jobs in which the relative performance is more important than the absolute one (Azmat and 
Petrongolo, 2014). In Section 2.2.2. we will argue that the distortion of competition is particularly 
linked to the math content of the tasks. This is a relevant finding. Moreover, in math contexts it 
results to be very large at the top of the performance distribution (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2010). 
It is crucial to investigate this effect from a policy perspective: allowing high-performing (in 
noncompetitive contexts) women to enter competitive environments could not be enough to assure 
equality of outcomes in presence of this distortion (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2011). 
Also in this case, we can find many contributions. Gneezy et al. (2003) run an experiment dividing 
participants into groups and asking them to solve mazes under different compensation regimes: 
piece-rate, competitive and random pay. Under the first one respondents were paid for they own 
performance, under the second and the third one only one participant in each group is paid based 
respectively on relative performance (the best performer is the one who receive the compensation) 
and on a random selection. Comparing piece-rate and competitive pay they show that the gender 
gap in performance, while not significant in the first case, increases (around three times) and 
become significant with competitive pressure, mostly driven by men positively responding to 
competition. With the random pay, in which both males’ and females’ performance are similar to 
that under piece-rate scheme, they show that the difference found in the tournament pay is not 
owing to the uncertainty of compensation. Of particular interest is that in single-sex groups females 
as well respond to competition significantly increasing their performance and narrowing the gender 
gap, while males seem not to be sensitive to competitors’ gender. The peculiar suggestion from 
this finding is that the main concern for women could be the competition against men. We will 
come back on this providing further evidence. Moreover, Gneezy and Rustichini (2004) show that 
the cross - gender difference in response to competition is already present in a group of Israelian 
children aged 9 years, although in a physical real effort task and without compensation. The gap in 
performance is, again, present only in the competitive context.  
Cotton et al. (2013) run an experiment in elementary schools submitting math tests to groups of 
children. They notice a stronger positive response to competition for men’s performance 




particular, in their study high-ability females tend to underperform, the reverse instead for low 
ability males. They design a repeated competition showing that the males’ advantage disappears 
after the first round arguing that the impact with competition could be the relevant trait for female 
children. Designing in parallel other contexts the authors show that when lowering the pressure on 
students, females better response to competition in each round well reflecting their abilities in the 
actual performance. Ors, Palomino and Peyrache (2013) in a nonexperimental study, with a real-
world setting, try to examine the distortion that we are exploring. These authors analyze a very 
competitive setting (with large future stakes) in which students take part in an entry exam to one 
of the most prestigious French schools (HEC). They find that men overperform women in this high 
pressure environment while their performance is equal or lower (against the same students) in 
recent and noncompetitive academic context. The latter evidence is confirmed in the less 
competitive first year of the course (obviously, for admitted students). Two interesting facts have 
to be mentioned. First, as they notice, these results are “unlikely to be explained by a “women 
shying away from competition” argument” since the percentage of graduating females from 
science-intensive high schools is similar to that of female candidates with the same academic 
background. In this sense, entry and performance in competition seem still to be two distinct issues. 
Second, looking at the performance distribution the gender gap is more substantial at the top having 
a material effect on the composition of selected students. Delfgaauw et al. (2013) in their field 
experiment investigate the effect of competitive pressure on Dutch retailers’ performance exposing 
to competition groups of retail stores. While observing the irrelevance of monetary incentives they 
find a positive effect of competition on sales growth both for female-led and male-led stores. 
Moreover, they find that the increase in performance is stronger when more team components have 
the same gender of the manager, with a symmetric effect both for men and women.  
Once provided evidence of the negative impact that competitive pressure has on females’ choices 
and relative performance (relative to males) due to their different preferences, we briefly present 
the Nature vs Nurture debate on the origin of these gender – specific preferences. 
2.2.1 Nature or Nurture 
From the literature we see that different factors lead women to stay away from competitive contexts 
and suffer pressure when performing. Competitiveness, risk aversion, feedback aversion, 
confidence potentially influence women’s behavior. We have mostly explored literature about 




and in interacting with pure “taste for competition” (for example, risk aversion in Niederle and 
Yestrumskas, 2008). Other authors suggest that distributional preferences (see Dasgupta et al., 
2019), inclination for cooperation and egalitarianism (Kuhn and Villeval, 2011) can explain 
women’s response to competition. Gender difference in beliefs could be a relevant factor as the 
distortion of competition is mainly encountered in stereotypical – male tasks (Niederle and 
Vesterlund, 2011). 
In general, there are several contributions trying to find evidence of gender specific preferences. 
There is also a wide debate about the origin of gender differences: the “Nature vs Nurture” debate. 
On the first side, part of the literature has tried to show a causal link between biological factors and 
females’ outcomes and preferences (for a review see respectively Azmat and Petrongolo, 2014, 
and Croson and Gneezy, 2009). On the nurture side, many authors sustain that causality comes 
from sociocultural factors. The main two approach are, first, to demonstrate that difference among 
males and females do not exist at very young age but are “learned” from the environment where 
individuals grow up and, second, to show that females from opposed cultures or backgrounds 
behave differently. 
Sutter and Rutzler (2010) and Gneezy and Rustichini (2004) find that male and female children 
respond to competition as adults, this is not true for Cardenas et al. (2012) who study Swedish and 
Colombian children aged around 10 (or for 3-years-old children in US in Savikhin, 2011). For what 
concerns the second approach, females from single sex schools have shown to be more similar to 
boys in terms of risk aversion and competitiveness (Booth and Nolen, 2012, and Booth and Nolen, 
2009), and this clearly confirms that circumstances in which individuals grow up are relevant in 
shaping their preferences. Gneezy et al. (2009) in an important experiment try to solve this debate. 
Similarly to other studies that we have described, they ask participants to face a physical task 
choosing to perform either under a piece-rate or a competitive compensation regime. Nevertheless, 
they run this experiment with children from opposed patriarchal and matrilineal societies: 
respectively, the Maasai society in Tanzania and the Khasi society in India. In the Maasai society, 
with a patriarchal organization, results replicate those we have seen so far: males compete more 
than females. The suggestive finding is that in the matrilineal society, where children have 
completely a different culture (and different examples) about the role of women, the classic finding 
is reversed: in this context females are those who show a stronger preference for the competitive 
regime. Once established the effect of socialization on individuals’ inclinations, Andersen et al. 




children and adolescents from patriarchal and matrilineal societies in India. They find that while 
7-years-old children show no gender differences in both kind of societies, this is still true only for 
15-years-old teenagers in the matrilineal society. In the opposed one, men becomes more 
competitive relative to women around puberty. 
There is evidence in the literature that both nature and nurture influence individual preferences. 
The fact that nurture plays a still relevant role crucially confirms that there is room for intervention 
in order to manipulate or, at least, better address these preferences (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2011). 
2.2.2 Math Tasks 
In the articles that we have described some authors show that relevant findings depend on which 
task is performed. For instance Dreber, Von Essen e Ranehill (2014) reveal that the gender gap in 
competition entry does not endure when submitting verbal tasks and that math tasks are relevant 
only for women, where these are “two different tasks that differ in associated stereotypes”. Cotton 
et al. (2013) in their experiment in elementary schools show that the first-round negative impact  
of competitive pressure on female children’s performance is not in place when switching to 
questions about arts and language. In other studies, actually, task does not seem to matter for very 
young students (previously described, Dreber et al., 2011 and Cardenas et al.,2012). In another 
important paper Shurchkov (2011) finds no gender difference in performance in verbal task while 
also in her study males better perform in math task. Interestingly, in a low pressure setting this gap 
shrinks and in the verbal task females even outperform males. This testifies that there are other 
forces than simple gender-specific taste for competition or, at least, that this preference is driven 
by other factors as stereotypes. Math task are typically associated to men. Past literature shows that 
the gender gap in math is smaller in contexts where gender stereotypes are less pronounced. 
Moreover, experiments demonstrate that individuals are underconfident in tasks typically 
associated to the opposite gender, this is true also for men (Carlana, 2019). This corroborates the 
hypothesis that females’ underperformance are subtly undermined by erroneous gender-tasks 
associations that self-fulfill through the effect on individuals’ behavior. Undoubtedly, as we have 
shown are “more male associated tasks that are important for labor market outcomes” (Dreber, Von 
Essen and Ranehill, 2014) and from a policy perspective it is clear that this dislike for competition, 
wherever it comes from, needs to be better addressed. Niederle and Vesterlund (2010) suggest 
some other potential explanations for females’ sensitiveness to math contexts and tasks. For 




“in contrast to verbal test scores, math test scores may better predict actual rank as well as future 
relative performance”. Another reason could be that the proportion of men that choose and 
specialize in this field with respect to women is much higher, then both actual and expected 
competitors are mainly males. Therefore, the real issue could be the competition against men. We 
think that the second explanation potentially has both a direct and indirect impact as the unbalanced 
presence of men in parallel contributes to strengthen field-specific stereotypes. Additionally, as we 
have argued, also the direct impact of “competition against men” could be owing to the “stereotype 
threat”. In next Section we further explore the latter argumentation from these authors to 
understand possible policy implications.  
2.2.3 Competing Against Men or Women? 
We have argued that confidence plays a major role when choosing the compensation scheme. One 
circumstance in which both beliefs about relative performance and attitude toward competition can 
be altered is the single sex competition (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2011). Huguet and Regner (2007) 
investigate the effect of “stereotype threat” finding that in a mathematical in-classroom test 
(presumably submitted to measure math abilities) women underperform in mixed-gender groups 
while not in same-gender groups. The gender composition seems to matter also in other studies, 
for example in the article by Delfgaauw et al. (2013), where teams of retailers responded better to 
competition in this condition. If we come back to Gneezy, Niederle and Rustichini (2003), they 
show that the same is true when individuals compete against each other: the distortion of 
competition causing female underperforming disappears in single-sex tournaments. The gender 
gap narrows in this environment also due to men responding less to the competitive compensation 
scheme. Not only performance, also probability of entry increases in same-gender groups 
conditional on performance (Booth and Nolen, 2012). 
Niederle et al. (2013) analyze the effect of a second-stage “soft quota” in which at least one winner 
of the competition has to be female, with no restrictions on the second winners’ characteristics. In 
the first stage participants need to choose the compensation regime as in the other experiments. 
Once chosen the tournament, they know that, at least for females, the competition becomes gender 
specific within the group they are selected in. Females need only to outperform participants of the 
same gender in order to get the reward. The authors find that their affirmative action increases the 
probability of entry for females while weakly discouraging males’ tournament choice with both 




compare the tournaments with and without the quota to assess eventual policy costs (e.g., reverse 
discrimination toward males that would have gained the compensation absent the action). They 
evaluate these costs both in the tournament with the actual quota and in the other tournament taking 
realized performance and applying a fictious “ex-post quota”. The fact that policy costs emerge 
only in the second case demonstrates that the quota is efficient only in case of prior announcement, 
giving the opportunity to females to change in confidence and beliefs about own relative 
performance. The affirmative action, notably, fosters high-achieving females’ tournament entry 
while narrowing the gap in confidence (as beliefs within gender are different) . From the previous 
comparison, as the authors underline, we see that “indirect effects that occur through self-selection 
into competitions” are crucial in order to counterbalance eventual costs that cancel out when the 
distortion of mixed gender competition is substantial. Maggian, Montinari and Nicolò (2017) run 
a lab experiment to study the effect of quotas on women’s career advancement. In this experiment 
they investigate the optimal timing for the introduction of a gender quota, possibly without any 
loss of efficiency, designing three types of treatment: a quota at entry level, at top level and at both 
stages. They find that the second and third treatments (a quota both at the top and at each stage of 
a career) successfully foster high performing women’s participation, where the first one turns to be 
“more advisable” specifically “under a principle of minimum interference”. Important, they 
observe the negative effect of a quota at entry-level that adversely affects women’s confidence 
causing them not to well perform at higher stages of their career. As we have seen, these kind of 
policies are sometimes accused to lower the efficiency (in terms of winners' performance) and to 
create reverse discrimination against males. This is not supported by evidence in the studies that 
we have described. On the contrary, they are needed when distortions as direct discrimination, 
stereotypes and their effect on individuals’ behavior induce a sub-optimal selection (Niederle et 
al., 2013) among winners of a competition or hired workers. 
Some authors argue that to increase effectiveness of policies the timing is crucial. Preference-
manipulating policies should be optimally run when preferences become gender-specific due to 
socialization (e.g. around puberty, Andersen et al., 2013). Undoubtedly, in the long term these kind 
of policies can be beneficial, but in the short run affirmative actions can be proven to improve 
efficiency and favor equity. Moreover, policies that foster the presence of women among high or 
best-achieving mathematicians, engineers and scientists potentially have long-term positive effects 
on female’ perception of own abilities and potential in these fields relaxing societal constraints 




contributions suggest that other policies can change females’ preferences about competition as 
performance feedback, that can improve women’s confidence (Dreber, Von Essen and Ranehill, 
2014), or teamwork (Flory et al., 2014, review from Azmat and Petrongolo, 2014).  
3. The Field Experiment: Progetto Rodonea 
This Field Experiment has been run during the Math Olympiad in randomly selected schools in the 
Italian North – East. The Math Olympiad, organized by “Unione Matematica Italiana” is the Italian 
oldest math competition that involve each year about 200’000 students from the whole country. It 
is an individual competition divided into three phases: school level, district level and national level. 
In parallel, it includes team-based contests. This experiment took place in the first phase where the 
competition was at school level, i.e. in order to win one student had to overperform only 
participants from the same school (where the competition physically took place). This phase is 
called “Giochi di Archimede” and took place on the 21st of November 2019 simultaneously in 
involved schools. Although sometimes with different criteria and different quotas per school, 
participants in higher levels are chosen based on previous level ranking. That is why not only the 
1st place is relevant for students in order to consider successful their participation. Moreover 
participants within schools are selected mainly based on three criteria: free, “suggested” (where 
professors invite presumably best-achieving students in math subjects to enjoy the competition) 
and “mandatory” participation. In the latter case students are obliged to participate mostly based 
either on meritocracy or belonging to specific (math-intensive) school curricula. However, the 
chosen criterion within the school is likely to be nonrandom and correlate with school-specific 
characteristics as prestige, reputation, attitude towards these extra-curricular competitions etc. The 
second and third criteria can generally imply the first one since among the pool of remaining (i.e., 
not-invited or not-obliged) students, pupils can ask to enjoy the competition. Though, it is likely to 
be rare and whenever different criteria coexist the intentional exclusion probably discourages not-
selected students.  
The experiment began about one month before the Olympiad when randomly selected students 
within the (in turn, randomly selected) schools where asked to fill a survey in order to collect data 
(age, family and academic background, self-reported math grade etc..) about them. Most important 
for our analysis, in this survey it was included a widely used and recognized test to measure 
students’ non-cognitive abilities: the Raven Test. We will exploit the score in this test in order to 




along the ability distribution. Once selected, schools were (again randomly) divided into three 
treatment groups with different incentive schemes:  
1. In the first group, independently on gender or other individual characteristics, 
the four students at the top of each single school ranking received a monetary 
reward. The first and second ranked student were rewarded with 200 euros each. 
The third and fourth classified participants received 100 euros. From now on, 
we will call this group “No Gender”. 
2. In the second group, both the first man and the first woman were rewarded with 
the highest pay (200 euros). So, virtually, in order to get the reward, it became 
a within-gender competition. The same division for the other prizes, both second 
male and second female student received 100 euros. We call this the “Gender” 
group.  
3. The control group with no incentives, i.e. no intervention in the experiment. We 
call this group “Baseline”. 
Competitions and incentive schemes are at school level. In order to get the reward each student had 
to rank at the top in her/his own school. Most important, the ranking-based prizes were announced 
well before the competition in the involved schools. As we have seen in the literature, affirmative 
actions have shown to need prior announcements in order to be effective allowing individuals to 
react adapting or modifying their preferences or expectations (and related behavior) . 
This interventions are supposed to foster both participation and performance within the 
competition. In order to better evaluate the effect of these treatments we will exploit the control 
group where we can observe outcomes absent the action. In particular, since from the previous 
Sections we have seen that women behave differently in single sex competitions, we want to 
understand whether the “Gender” treatment has a positive effect in either narrowing or closing the 
cross-gender participation and performance gap (we will first control for realized gaps both in the 
Control group and the No Gender group). So, we will deepen these two comparisons. First, the 
effect of monetary incentives (or higher pressure in an already competitive environment) 
comparing treatment groups with the control one. Second, we will investigate whether the 





4. Data and Variables 
In this Section we present our data sources and sample. We exploit four main sources:  
1. The survey submitted to students in involved school;  
2. Individual-level data about participation and Math Olympiad performance; 
3. Data about schools’ characteristics; 
4. Fondazione Agnelli2’s dataset.  
Most important, the survey was randomly submitted to students within involved school, that is why 
we do not have information from this source for each math Olympiad participant. While we 
collected data about school characteristics for each single school, the Fondazione Agnelli’s dataset 
does not cover every track (or, curriculum) within schools. We have two main samples: students 
that filled the questionnaire and students that enjoined the math competition. We will look, in 
particular, at the second group to detect eventual gap in performance and evidence of realized 
treatment effect with a cross-sample comparison. In order to exploit other data sources we will 
deepen the analysis controlling our results’ robustness with a regression approach trying to solve 
the selection problem. Therefore, at the end, for our analysis we will study the so-called “matched” 
group for which we have complete informations (i.e. students that both filled the survey and 
participated at the Math Olympiad). Exploiting all sources we will further restrict the analysis to 
the group whose involved tracks are included in the Fondazione Agnelli’s dataset. The latter is 
important to check whether the effect that we see is driven by schools’ quality or characteristics. 
We will look at data comparing distributions of variables across different groups. In order to 
understand if these groups are similar (or if the mean of considered variables in distinct groups is 
significantly different) we will exploit two tests: the T-Test and the Kruskal-Wallis Test with the 
latter being a generalization of the Mann-Whitney Test Method for multivalued variables (i.e., for 
variables that define two or more than two groups). The null hypothesis for the T-Test is that the 
mean of considered variables is equal in both groups while for the Kruskal-Wallis Test is that 
samples belong to the same population (i.e., the mean is not significantly different across defined 
groups). For both tests we use the version for clustered data since in our sample observations are 
divided into clusters (schools) whose intra-correlation should be taken into account. When 
computing means and running tests, for variables that refer to schools we have one observation for 
 




each single school, the same for tracks within schools (e.g., variables defined based on Fondazione 
Agnelli’s dataset). 
Let us see into detail these sources, our derived variables, the sample’s characteristics and data 
about performance. For the sake or readability we will include in the text only the most significant 
tables. You will find other tables at the end of this work (p.50). 
4.1. The Survey 
The first source is our survey. In this survey we collected, about one month before the competition, 
informations about randomly selected students within involved schools. Both timing and 
randomness are relevant, in particular for the No Gender and Gender groups, in order not to 
influence participants when filling the survey. Indeed, the questionnaire and the intervention with 
incentive schemes were presented as separated issues. For the scope of this analysis, we will exploit 
data about the Raven Test scores, test that was included in the survey in order to measure students’ 
non-cognitive abilities. This is the only students’ objective ability measure at our disposal. “The 
Raven’s Standard Progressive Matrices (RSPM) instrument is a multiple-choice test used to assess 
mental ability associated with abstract reasoning” (Bilker et al., 2012). The original test from Raven 
(1938) includes 60-items in which the respondent has to choose the right answer mainly among 6 
or 8 choices. Other versions of this test are available. In our Survey we used the version from Bilker 
et al. (2012, version A) that includes 9 items. Authors have studied the predicted power (predictive 
of the 60-items test score) of smaller variants of the test optimizing first the number of items then 
identifying the right questions to include in the best-predictive 9-items version.  
 




For each right answer respondents received one point, so the minimum and the maximum of the 
Raven Test score were respectively 0 and 9. Students had 270 seconds to answer correctly as many 
questions as they could. After this time they could no longer change or add responses being 
redirected to the next phase of the questionnaire. Respondents were aware of the limited time but 
there wasn’t any timer on their screen. This should have prevented desperate or random answer. In 
Figure 1 we show one question as an example, where the right answer is the number 5. 
Based on the Raven Test Score we have identified top students, defined as student whose score 
was above a certain threshold in the score distribution at school level. We have established three 
thresholds: the 50th , 75th and 90th percentiles in order to identify respectively students belonging to 
the within-school (among students who filled the survey) top 50, 25 and 10 of the distribution. 
From an economic perspective it is important to understand how the treatments’ effect, if any, is 
distributed along the ability distribution. We have seen in the reported literature that mainly top-
skilled women’s outcomes are distorted by competitive contexts. In general, efficiency-optimizing 
policies designed to encourage participation and foster performance of specific groups of people 
are most often meant for top abilities or (at least potentially) high achieving subjects that fail to 
enter appropriate context and to well-reflect their abilities in realized performance. That is why 
also in this case we will investigate whether our intervention can manage to boost top females’ 
performance increasing, in turn, their probability of winning the competition and access upper 
levels. 
In Table 11 (p.50) we see that the survey was submitted to students coming from 29 schools: 8 
belonging to the Baseline group, 11 and 10 respectively for the No Gender and the Gender group. 
In next paragraphs we will look at info on schools. In the second Section of this table (Section 
“Info on students”) we see that in the entire sample as well as in the top 10, 25 and 50 both males 
and females are well represented (never below the 40% of the subsamples), even when separately 
considering different treatment groups. In the same Table we report within-group means of Raven 
Test scores for the entire sample of students that filled out the survey (i.e., the entire score 
distribution) and for top students, also dividing by gender. In the last column we report the p-values 
of the Kruskal-Wallis Test for clustered data that tests the hypothesis that the mean of our variables 
is not statistically different across treatment groups. High p-values testify that both when 
considering entire groups and single genders, we cannot reject the hypothesis that they belong to 
the same population in terms of abilities (measured with the Raven Test Score). This is true both 




important to clarify that students are statistically equally skilled across groups, so we do not expect 
to see one group performing better than the others absent the action (i.e., if we observe different 
performance it is not due to different abilities across treatment groups).  
As underlined in the previous Section, in order to exploit informations about students’ abilities to 
investigate heterogenous treatment effects along the ability distribution we will restrict the analysis 
to the “matched” subsample (students that both filled the survey and enjoined the math 
competition). We are interested in understand two things: first, if the just-explained evidence of 
treatment groups belonging to the same population holds in this subsample; second, whether the 
matched group is statistically different from the remaining pool of students or it can be considered 
representative of the entire sample. Table 12 (p.51) is similar to the previous one but considers only 
the matched group. Still, both when considering within-group averages either dividing by gender 
or not we cannot reject the Kruskal Wallis Test’s null hypothesis. This is true for the entire score 
distribution as well as for top students. For what concerns the comparison between “matched” and 
“not-matched” students we look at Table 14 (p.52) where we report within-group means of test 
scores for various sub-groups. We can notice that when considering the entire sample of students 
that filled the survey matched individuals have significantly higher scores. This means that, even 
if the survey was randomly submitted in the schools, we casually selected better student based on 
these scores. This difference holds, in particular, for females. Anyway, looking at the top of the 
distribution (top 10, 25 and 50) we cannot reject the T-Test’s null hypothesis of equality of means 
for matched and not-matched individuals. High p-values suggest that the difference across these 
two subsamples is mostly driven by disparity at the bottom of the score distribution. Hence, looking 
at this evidence from our survey we have run significant randomness checks. Students, in terms of 
abilities are well distributed across treatment groups and looking at Olimpyad scores we will 
examine a representative group of students, in particular top students, thanks to the randomization 
when submitting the questionnaire.  
4.2. The Math Olympiad 
The second source are data about participation and individual’s performance at the Math Olympiad. 
In the following table we report data about schools and students for the sample of individuals for 
which we have Math Olympiad scores. Still, looking at the second Section “Info on students” we 
see that both males and females are well represented in the sample of 6060 participants. In the third 




whether there is a significant difference across treatment groups. Within-group averages are 
computed considering one observation for each single school. While there is no cross-subsample 
significant difference in the number of total and female participants, in the Gender group the 
percentage of female participants with respect to the total number of females within school is 
significantly lower. This difference does not hold for male participants.  
Table 1. Variables by Treatment     
 Baseline No gender Gender K-Wallis c 
(p-value) 
SAMPLE OF INDIVIDUALS WITH SCORES     
     
INFO ON SCHOOLS d     
Number of participating schools 9 11 9  
Average number of females in school 444 (51%) 547 (51%) 464 (51%) 0.7754 
Average number of students in school 833 1060 935 0.5410 
Olympiads selection criteria a: 








     Suggested 1 5 2  
     Mandatory 7 4 3  
Average number of tracks per school 3.67 3.73 4.44 0.3364 
Track Specific b:      
     Females' Matriculation Rate (University) 86% 89% 82% 0.0836 
     Males' Matriculation Rate (University) 85% 86% 81% 0.5873 
     Females choosing STEM fields 48% 48% 41% 0.2805 
     Males choosing STEM fields 64% 59% 61% 0.9786 
     FGA Index 68.44 71.87 68.44 0.2765 
     
INFO ON STUDENTS     
Number of participating students 2344 2404 1302  
     Males 1281 (54.6%) 1330 (55.3%) 782 (60.1%)  
     Females 1063 (45.4%) 1074 (44.7%) 520 (39.9%)  
Olympiads selection criteria a: 








     Suggested 58 (2.5%) 542 (22.5%) 317 (24.4%)  
     Mandatory 2266 (96.7%) 1612 (67.1%) 568 (43.6%)  










Average number of female participants in 
school 
118 (46%) 98 (43%) 57 (41%) 0.4211 
Average number of participants in school 260 219 144 0.5333 
Female participants vs Females in school 37% 19% 14% 0.0464 
Male participants vs Males in school 41% 28% 22% 0.1155 
Participants in school vs Students in school 38% 22% 17% 0.0665 
Olympiad Score (Average) 32.53 (16.33) 31.99 (14.49) 31.96 (15.27) 0.9562 
     Olympiad Score Females (Average) 30.57 (14.81) 29.84 (12.81) 29.82 (13.86) 0.9603 
     Olympiad Score Males (Average) 34.16 (17.32) 33.72 (15.50) 33.39 (15.98) 0.9137 
     
Percentages and standard deviations in parentheses. 
a. It is the criterion that professors in the school use to select Olympiads participants. The participation can be on a voluntary basis (i.e. 
“Free”). On the other hand participants can be chosen by professors (“Suggested”) that invite best students to participate, or it can be 
that some classes or best students are forced to participate based on merits or other characteristics (“Mandatory”). Also these two 
criteria in some cases could imply that not invited or forced students can join the competition but it is likely to be rare. 
b. These data refer to single tracks within each school and come from Fondazione Agnelli. Data are not available for every track but 
almost the entire sample is covered. Numbers are within sample averages. 
c. The null hypothesis is that means are equal across samples (i.e. samples belong to the same population). When comparing Olympiad 
Scores and Track Specific data it is a Kruskal-Wallis test for clustered data. Clusters: Schools. 





Important to verify is whether this women’s lower participation is due to the treatment’s effect or 
to other factors. In the first case the incentive scheme based on students’ gender could discourage 
females’  entry in the competition, this would not be in line with the reported literature. In the 
second case selection criteria or other factors could negatively influence females’ participation and 
we should control for this in our regression analysis since there could be a negative effect also on 
observed Olympiad score. We want to point out two important facts: 
• First, also the fact that participation is not significantly different across treatment groups 
should be investigated since this does not necessarily means that monetary incentives do 
not encourage participation. As before, there are other factors potentially influencing 
participation for both genders limiting or even counter-balancing any treatment effect. 
Moreover, this effects could be heterogenous across genders regardless of the type of 
incentive scheme. For example, schools that select best students could tend to choose more 
males if they think that men are better prone to competition with respect to females or 
simply because of stereotypes about students’ perceived math ability. When examining 
treatment effects we have to take into account for these residual factors since they 
potentially alter our evaluation of results in particular, as we will see, in groups where 
students are almost never free to choose whether to enjoy the competition. We will deepen 
this issue in Section 4.3 ; 
• Second, the Kruskal-Wallis Test allows us to compare at the same time all three groups, 
and this is useful to understand whether they can be considered homogeneous based on 
observed variables. The limit of this Test is that it says nothing about cross-groups pair 
comparison. From the previous table we see that all variables suggest that in the Gender 
group the participation is lower both considering the absolute number and the percentage 
of students within the schools enjoying the competition. Our test verifies that (except for 
the percentage of female participants vs the number of women within the schools) these 
differences are not significant. But, since means are very different, it could be that in a pair-
comparison the Gender group results to be very different from, for example, the Baseline 
group. Again, we should then examine whether this is caused by the incentive scheme. In 
next Sections we will report only the significant pair-comparisons that will give us useful 
insights for our analysis.  
Other variables shown in Table 1 will be described in proper paragraphs. Now we look at individual 




4.2.1. Olympiad Scores 
Italian high-school courses last 5 year. The test in the competition is different for the first two years 
(called “biennio”) and the other three years (called “triennio”). In particular, students attending the 
first two years of the course have to answer 16 problems, while older students have a test with 20 
questions. In order to make scores comparable, those of the first group of students are multiplied 
by 1.25. That is why in next tables sometimes we will call them “Normalized Scores”. This could 
be an issue when comparing scores of students from different classes but we will address it 
controlling for this difference in our regression analysis. For what concerns scores, students receive 
5 points for each right answer, 1 or 0 points respectively for blank and wrong responses. This 
should discourage random answering. As for the Raven Test Score, we want to verify whether 
“matched” students can be considered a representative group of the whole sample of participants 
in terms of  Math Olympiad scores. This is important as we will look at this narrow group to 
understand if top students have differently reacted to incentive schemes. For this purpose we look 
at Table 13 (p.52) that similarly to Table 14 (p.52) reports averages of scores both for matched and 
not-matched individuals. When looking at the whole sample as well as single treatment groups 
averages are not significantly different between matched and not-matched students. The same holds 
when considering single genders. This means that if we restrict the analysis to the sample of 
matched individuals we can potentially extend our results to the whole sample. This narrow sample 
is not statistically different from the entire sample that filled the survey in terms of abilities (see 
Section 4.1) and is not different from the sample for which we have data about Math Olympiad 
performance (in terms of Olympiad scores). The matched subsample comes from the intersection 
of these two broader samples and for these reasons it can be considered a valid representative group 
of both of them. 
We want to look now at Math Olympiad scores to investigate first evidence from summary 
statistics.  In the Table 2 (below) we report within (treatment) group Olympiad score averages both 
for the entire sample of participating students and for top students. Remember that top students are 
defined looking at the score distribution of individuals that filled the survey for who we have the 
Raven Test scores. Testing the equality of means with the Kruskal-Wallis Test, we can see that in 
the entire sample averages are very similar (p = 0.9562) even when separately considering males 
and females. This means that in this first look we cannot find any treatment effect since there is no 




Table 2. Difference across samples in performance at the Math Olympiads 
Sample Subsample N° Obs Baseline No Gender Gender P-Value (K-
Wallis a) 
Entire with Score b  6060 32.53 31.99 31.96 0.9562 
Entire with Score b Females 2664 30.57 29.84 29.82 0.9603 
Entire with Score b Males 3396 34.16 33.71 33.39 0.9137 
Top 10%  490 46.92 36.64 40.23 0.1654 
Top 10% Females 245 41.30 32.33 37.54 0.1502 
Top 10% Males 245 52.64 41.96 42.21 0.2141 
Top 25%  986 40.98 34.94 37.05 0.4202 
Top 25% Females 496 35.96 31.95 33.59 0.6970 
Top 25% Males 490 45.81 38.93 39.59 0.3848 
Top 50%  1676 37.74 33.29 35.05 0.5405 
Top 50% Females 865 33.74 30.90 31.97 0.8205 
Top 50% Males 811 41.61 36.54 37.54 0.5553 
a. The null hypothesis is that means are equal across samples (i.e. samples belong to the same population). It is a Kruskal-Wallis test for 
clustered data. Clusters: Schools. 
b. The Sample includes all individuals that participated at the Math Olympiad. 
 
higher in subsamples that received monetary rewards, neither in the No Gender nor in the Gender 
group. If we look at the top of the ability distribution we find the same evidence although the scores 
become very different, in particular in the top 10. We will deeply investigate this first evidence’s 
robustness controlling for differences across treatment groups. Indeed, these differences could hide 
eventual treatment effects because of the incomparability of treatment groups.  
4.2.2. The Observed Gap 
Before looking at other variables and include them in our regression analysis, we want to check for 
any realized gender gap in math performance along the ability distribution. In Table 3, we report 
males’ and females’ average score in the entire sample for which we have scores, separately 
reporting also within-treatment-group averages. We do the same restricting the sample to the 
matched group, looking at top students. We then report the difference and test the null hypothesis 
of equality of means to understand whether this difference is statistically significant. In the top 
panel of our table we see that the gap in performance is present in the whole sample as well as in 
each single group, but we cannot reject the hypothesis that means are equal across genders. 
Interestingly, in other panels we see that among high-skilled student males overperform females 
with the gender gap being wider and significant at the top of the ability distribution when 
considering all three groups together. Males significantly (p < 0.05) perform better than females 
both in the top 10, 25 and 50 respectively with a positive difference in average performance of 
8.65, 7.57 and 6.34. However, looking at within-group differences we cannot infer any treatment 




is never statistically significant in the single treatment groups. Also in this case, we will check for 
robustness of these results in next Sections.  
What remains interesting in this first look are two things. First, the gender gap in performance 
seems to be wider and significant at the top of the  ability distribution. Second, in the top 10 the 
gap shrinks in the Gender group compared to the other groups, although we cannot hypothesize 
any treatment effect since the gender gap is not significant neither in the Baseline nor in the No 
Gender group. In the previous Section we have shown that students’ (even considering single 
genders) realized performance are statistically not different in means across treatment groups. We 
have found now that this evidence holds also comparing within-groups gender gaps. The latter 
comparison takes into account that even if treatment groups are different in characteristics, males 
and females come from the same schools sharing the same trends. However, in each group there 
are several schools. Still, we have to control for other factors influencing participation and 
performance to understand if “ceteris paribus” treatments had any significant effect on females’ 
relative outcomes. That is, we do not only care about absolute effects on participation and 
performance (that we have seen in the previous Section) but also about the heterogenous effect 
across genders, especially at the top of the distribution were the gap seems to be wider. 
Table 3 . Gender Gap in performance at the Math Olympiads 






Entire with Score  6060 33.81 30.13 3.67 0.1564 
Entire with Score Baseline 2344 34.16 30.57 3.58 0.2996 
Entire with Score No Gender 2404 33.72 29.84 3.87 0.3150 
Entire with Score Gender 1302 33.39 29.81 3.57 0.5550 
Top 10%  490 44.50 35.84 8.65 0.0319 
Top 10% Baseline 113 52.64 41.30 11.34 0.1629 
Top 10% No Gender 219 41.96 32.33 9.63 0.1072 
Top 10% Gender 158 42.21 37.54 4.67 0.4586 
Top 25%  986 40.95 33.37 7.57 0.0251 
Top 25% Baseline 247 45.81 35.96 9.84 0.3146 
Top 25% No Gender 420 38.93 31.95 6.98 0.0948 
Top 25% Gender 319 39.59 33.59 6.00 0.0937 
Top 50%  1676 38.18 31.84 6.34 0.0225 
Top 50% Baseline 407 41.61 33.74 7.87 0.3282 
Top 50% No Gender 759 36.54 30.90 5.64 0.2867 
Top 50% Gender 510 37.54 31.97  5.57 0.1876 










4.3. School Data 
In this experiment we had a two-way randomization. First, schools were randomly included in the 
experiment among the pool of schools located in the Italian North-East that comprehends four 
regions: Veneto, Emilia Romagna, Friuli-Venezia Giulia and Trentino-Alto Adige. Second, 
selected schools were randomly assigned to a treatment group. The fist randomization is necessary 
to avoid to include in the experiment “special” schools in order to be able to generalize findings 
that need not to be strictly linked to the selection procedure (i.e., to be externally valid). The second 
randomization is important to assure that schools in different groups are similar and single schools’ 
characteristics (e.g., quality, reputation, teaching methods etc.) are not correlated with the type of 
treatment. We know that the randomization procedure allows us to meet the condition of 
exogeneity for our treatment variable. Indeed, this permits to investigate treatments’ effect simply 
looking at summary statistics (in particular, means). Unfortunately, the randomization process 
needs to be verified because characteristics could not be successfully balanced across treatment 
groups making them not directly comparable. We exploit our data sources to investigate this 
balancing verifying that control variables effectively have not any statistical relationship with the 
treatment variable. Once verified the randomization procedure we will include these variables in 
regressions in order to control for differences across selected schools. In order to simplify our 
analysis we do this exercise only for schools included in the “matched” sample (i.e., schools in 
which both the questionnaire and the survey were submitted and in which there are matched 
students). Indeed, this is the sample we are interested in.  
In Table 4 we report the distribution of schools among treatments divided by region. At the bottom 
of this table we report the p-value of the Fisher’s Test. Under the null hypothesis there is no 
significant relationship between the treatment variable and the variable “region”. We cannot reject 
this hypothesis, hence the 27 selected schools are well-randomized across regions. 
Table 4. Distribution of Schools Among Treatments by Region 
 Baseline No gender Gender Total 
Veneto 2 2 3 7 
Emilia Romagna 1 5 3 9 
Friuli-Venezia Giulia 4 4 1 9 
Trentino - Alto Adige 0 0 2 2 
Total 7 11 9 27 




Before the competition took place we submitted a survey to one math professor (the one that was 
in charge of the organization of the within-school competition) for each involved school to collect 
some data about own school’s characteristics. Most important for this analysis, we asked the overall 
number of students (asking to specify the distribution of pupils among genders) in the school and 
the way the math Olympiad participants were selected in the school. In order to understand whether 
schools are homogeneous across treatments we look at within group averages for the number of 
students. Restricting the analysis at the matched group we exploit the top panel of Table 12 (p. 51, 
Info on Schools). Differences between within-group averages are not statistically significant 
neither in the number of students nor in the number (and percentage) of females. For what concerns 
selection, as seen before, we have defined three criteria: free, suggested and mandatory 
participation. In order the treatment to have a positive effect on students’ participation the first 
criterion is needed since the monetary incentive could not change students’ choice in an 
environment in which they actually do not choose. Moreover, the selection criterion is potentially 
correlated with other schools’ characteristics as prestige, quality, reputation etc. That is, it can 
capture other factors that influence also students’ realized performance (not only competition 
entry). In Figure 2 we show the distribution of schools among selection criteria for each treatment 
group. We reported this distribution also in table form (see Table 18, p.54). In Table 18 the p-value 
of the Fisher’s Test suggests that there is not significant relationship between the type of treatment 
and the selection criterion (although this comparison includes all three groups together). Also this 
characteristic results to be well balanced across treatment groups. Coming back to Figure 2 we can 
say something about this distribution. The  first  relevant  fact  that  we  want  to  underline  is  that   
 




in the schools assigned to the Baseline group none of them allows students to freely enter the 
competition. On the contrary the vast majority of schools (6 out of 7) use mandatory participation. 
Second, the Gender group is the one that includes the highest number (44.44%) of school with the 
latter criterion. Also the No Gender group seems not to be well-balanced since the majority of 
schools chose the criterion “Suggested”. Said this, we are interested in cross-groups balancing since 
our need is the comparison between groups (so, that the type of treatment is not correlated with the 
selection criteria). Even if the randomization worked in this case, these facts suggest that the 
distribution of schools among selection criteria could hardly compromise the cross-treatment-
groups comparison. We will come back on this, exploiting evidence from the regression approach, 
in the last part of our analysis. 
Within schools students attend different tracks (or, curricula). These tracks can differ in several 
characteristics. Some curricula are more math-intensive (e.g., Liceo Scientifico), others focus more 
on arts and language (e.g., Liceo Artistico, Liceo Classico, Liceo Linguistico etc.). Tracks differ 
also in the way they prepare students to university or to the labor markets (academic vs vocational 
tracks). Although schools are most often specialized in some curricula, they always include 
different tracks that share same school trends but could heavily differ in quality and already cited 
characteristics. For the scope of this analysis, the math intensity surely represent the most important 
feature. In our tables (1, 11, 12) we report for each sample the within-group averages of curricula 
present in involved schools. This says something about the type of school and the degree of 
specialization. Looking at Table 12 (p.51), we cannot reject the hypothesis that schools included 
in the matched sample are homogenous across treatment groups in the number of offered curricula 
(Kuskal-Wallis p-value: 0.2938). However, this evidence still holds when looking at the sample of 
schools in which the survey was submitted (Table 1, p.24) and schools for which we have data 
about Math Olympiad outcomes (Table 11 p.50). Not surprisingly since for the major part they 
include the same schools. Our main concern is that Olympiad participants (and then matched 
students) are equally distributed among academic curricula across different treatment groups. In 
Table 16 (p.53) we show this distribution. The Chi2 Test (with a p-value equal to 0.0000) shows 
that there is a significant relationship between tracks and treatments. Clearly, this is a relevant issue 
since having more students attending math-intensive courses in a particular group could hide or 
simply alter observed treatment effects. For example, females in the No Gender group could 
overperform that included in the gender-based treatment just because they belong to different 




gender competitions” would be wrong. In Table 17 (p.53) we show the gender composition of 
single tracks. Here we notice that the type of curriculum is significantly related (Chi2 Test p-value 
= 0.0000) to the variable “gender”. This means that some tracks are male-dominated  (e.g. Liceo 
Scientifico – Scienze Applicate that offers a strong preparation in math), in other tracks the reverse 
holds (e.g. Liceo Classico). From the previous and the latter evidence, we deduct that in our 
regression approach we should control for track-specific effects including dummies for each 
curriculum. 
4.3.1 Other Sources: Fondazione Agnelli 
The difference across tracks can potentially alter our analysis. Including dummies for each track 
allows us to control for cross-treatment-group differences in the distribution of students among 
curricula. What remains uncontrolled for are single tracks’ characteristics. Same curricula offered 
in different schools share almost the same program but can still differ. Until now, we have not 
mentioned the most important factor that influence students’ readiness for math competitions and 
realized performance: school quality. We need a measure of quality since, as for already defined 
variables, the unbalanced distribution of students among high-quality schools is another potential 
threat for interpretation of results. In order to solve these two issues (difference in same curricula 
characteristics across schools and quality of education) we exploit data from the Fondazione 
Agnelli’s Dataset (that covers almost our entire “matched” sample).  
Fondazione Agnelli (from now on, FGA) collects data about tracks within each single school. In 
particular, they have informations about past years tracks’ performance. We think that this 
approach is really effective since, as argued before, considering the entire school would cause 
altered evaluations due to strong differences across curricula offered in the same school. For these 
reasons, in this paragraph we will not refer to involved schools but to single tracks within these 
schools (in particular, schools included in the matched sample). From the FGA’ s dataset we first 
exploit data about past students’ matriculation (at University) rates represented as the percentage 
of students that successfully applied for any university after completed the high school. Data refer 
to within-track averages in the period 2014-2017. This permits to compare single tracks’ academic 
attitude and quality. This is relevant for two reasons. First, in our sample also vocational tracks are 
involved (e.g., Istituto Professionale). Second, matriculation rates are likely to strongly correlate 





Figure 2. Within-groups average matriculation rates by gender. Unit: single track. Data source: FGA. 
 
Figure 3. Within-groups average proportion of student choosing STEM careers by gender. Unit: single track. Data source: FGA. 
 
 




evaluate more deeply tracks in our sample. Moreover, gender-specific data potentially capture other 
forces influencing students’ attitude toward math competitions.  In  Figure  2  we  show  within-
treatment-group  averages  with confidence interval bars that help to compare our three group. In 
this figure, as well as in the other similar ones that we are going to show, confidence interval bars 
take into account that groups of tracks belong to the same school (i.e., they control for intra-clusters 
correlation). We report these averages also in table form (Table 12, p. 51) and test the Kruskal-
Wallis Test’ null hypothesis. Within group averages are very similar and there is not significant 
difference across groups both in males’ and females’ matriculation rates (although slightly lower 
in the Gender group). In Figure 3 (and Table 12, p.51) we show the within-group average 
percentage of males and females that chose STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering and 
Mathematics) fields among those who successfully applied for any University. With this variable 
that we call “STEM choice” we also control for math intensity in academic programs of tracks 
involved in our sample. Looking at confidence interval bars and p-values in Table 12 we see that 
also in this case our three treatment groups are not significantly different. Further examining the 
reported figure we want to underline two facts. First, also in this case the Gender group has lower 
means, in particular for females. This is a potential threat since in the group in which we want to 
foster women’s performance with the gender-based incentive scheme, the average number of 
females choosing the STEM field is lower (although the difference is not significant in the cross-
groups comparison). Second, it is evident that, while the average matriculation rates in the previous 
figure (Figure 2) seem to be almost equal across genders, the percentage of males choosing STEM-
based careers results to be significantly higher than that of females. Of course averages refer to 
tracks involved in our matched sample but this is certainly in line with evidence from the past 
literature described in Chapter 2. In order to have a synthetic measure of tracks’ quality we finally 
exploit the FGA index. This index is computed by FGA that assigns a score from 0 to 100 to each 
single track based on students’ (that got high school diploma in that track) performance in the 
University career in the period 2014-2017. Data about these performance include grades (weighted 
for the number of credits associated to respective courses) and obtained credits in the first year of 
course at University were these two informations have equal weights (50:50). In particular, the 
index3 is a standardized measure that takes into account for heterogeneity across Universities and 
courses and for this reason it makes scores comparable across tracks.  
 




We will see that the effect of schools’ quality on students’ participation could be either positive or 
negative. On the contrary, for what concerns the effect of tracks’ quality on students’ performance 
we certainly expect to find a positive effect just because pupils are better trained. In Figure 4 (and 
Table 12, p.51) we show averages within treatment groups and also in this case we find that, thanks 
to randomization, students are well distributed among schools with different FGA Index scores. 
We want to clarify that shown averages do not exactly reflect those present in the FGA’s dataset. 
First, because in this dataset data were not ready to use for our analysis’ purpose. This is true both 
for matriculation rates and STEM choices. In the latter case we identified fields to include in the 
broader category “STEM”. Adding up single careers data (e.g., math, statistics, engineering etc) 
we obtained the percentage of students choosing STEM fields (for single genders). Second, there 
is little difference in the way we have collected data. When collecting data about tracks we had a 
single item called “Istituto Tecnico” while they make a further distinction between “Istituto 
Tecnico – Economico” and “Istituto Tecnico – Tecnologico”. For this reason, for schools in which 

















5. Regression Analysis 
In this Chapter we deepen our analysis with a regression approach. In previous Sections we have 
first looked at realized outcomes in our experiment in terms of participation and performance. In 
particular, we have investigated these outcomes in several subgroups both examining cross-gender 
differences and analyzing how these results vary along the students’ ability distribution. Most 
important, we have seen how participation and performance vary across treatment groups in order 
to understand whether incentive schemes have differently (or not) influenced students’ outcomes. 
From this first look we have found evidence of lower participation for females in the Gender Group 
and of a positive gender gap in performance in favor of males, in particular among the pool of high-
ability students. No difference in performance across treatment groups has emerged. The 
interpretation of these results hardly depends on the characteristics of considered subsamples. 
Looking at variable at our disposal we have seen that our three treatment groups differ in some 
factors, although the most significant difference is in the distribution of students among school 
curricula. This is a relevant difference since tracks differ in math intensity and other important 
factors.  In a perfect randomization scenario it would not be necessary to further analyze outcomes 
since the treatment variable would be perfectly exogenous, samples would be balanced and the 
interpretation of results exploiting differences across means would be unbiased. Since randomized 
groups result to be not perfectly balanced and different in some characteristics we want now to 
check the robustness of previous results analyzing the effect of our treatments. In case the treatment 
variable is correlated with observed variables, the inclusion of the latters in our regressions allows 
to eliminate (or, at least, reduce) the bias coming from this correlation since the treatment variable 
would no longer be correlated with the error. We exploit this approach to investigate the effect of 
the two incentive schemes both on participation and on students’ performance. The Baseline group 
permits to analyze the cited effects comparing the No Gender and the Gender group with a “no 
intervention” scenario represented from the control group itself. 
5.1. Participation 
In this Section we focus on the first outcome variable: participation. Here we want to understand 
whether incentive schemes have caused participation to vary across treatment groups. We can 
exploit already shown variables to check whether eventual differences in participation are driven 




Table 5. Treatments’ effect on the percentage of participants  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Percentage of Participants in School 1     























































Track Dummies No Yes Yes Yes 
Matriculation Rates 4 No No Yes Yes 
Stem Choice 4 No No Yes Yes 
Location 5 No No No Yes 
Observations 10132 8447 8391 8391 
R2 0.263 0.653 0.684 0.774 
1. The dependent variable is the percentage of students in the school participating at the Math  
Olympiad. 
2. Base Category: Control group “Baseline”. 
3. Base Category : “Free”; 
4. Track Specific variables defined by gender (included both for males and females); 
5. Includes regional dummies and the number of inhabitants of the city where the school is located. 
Standard errors in parentheses. . Standard errors adjusted for 27 clusters in school. 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
the dependent variable is the percentage of participants in the school. This is our main regression 
for the first outcome variable since we do not want to analyze the treatment effect on the absolute 
number of participants that does not take into account the different school size (in terms of number 
of students). As you can notice from the bottom panels we add in each column variables to control 
for any difference across treatment groups. Among the set of controls we include variables 
described in  Chapter 4. We further add only the “number of inhabitants of the city where the school 
is located”. This because we think that the variable “region” in our regression does not perfectly 
describe the location of involved schools. In the same region schools could be located either in big 
cities/centers or in small towns. In this sense, the location can, for example, differently influence 
school’s quality or financial resources. The location can also capture the different attitude in the 
school toward students and teaching methods. Coming back to our regression, the observations are 
students coming from the 27 considered schools, and standard errors are adjusted for the intra-
clusters correlation (that is, the regression takes into account that observations in our sample are 




students that filled the survey and students that enjoined the math competition. In the top panel we 
show the coefficients of most relevant variables. In the first specification (column 1) only the 
Gender treatment has a negative and significant effect. This effect is no longer significant when 
adding controls in our regression. Remember that the base category for the treatment variable is 
the Baseline group. Hence, the observed treatment effects are with respect to the no-intervention 
scenario. The FGA index, our proxy for school quality, has a negative and significant effect both 
in the third and the forth columns and is robust to the introduction of control variables. This means 
that the higher the quality of the school the lower is the percentage of participating students (with 
respect to the total number of students in the school). The negative effect of the FGA index could 
capture the different approach that high quality schools have with these extra-curricular 
competitions. For example, high quality schools could allow only best student to participate in 
order to obtain higher average performance in the competition. When adding controls in our 
regression we can notice that the “Selection Criteria” is the most relevant variable driving cross-
schools (and, in turn, cross-groups) differences in the percentage participation. This, in pair with 
the not-significant coefficients of the treatment variable, suggests that realized differences do not 
depend on the introduction of the incentive schemes. Therefore, looking at the second outcome 
variable (performance) it is necessary to control both for participation and selection criteria when 
analyzing treatment effects on students’ score at the Math Olympiad. The cross-groups difference 
in selection and participation could hardly bias interpretation of results and policy outcomes. At 
the end of this work (Appendix A, p.56) we study the same treatment effects using as dependent 
variable the individual participation. In particular, it is a dummy that takes 1 if the student enjoined 
the math competition, 0 otherwise. In the greater part of our sample students seem not to be free to 
choose whether to participate or not. In this scenario it is hard for monetary incentives to motivate 
students or change their participation choice. For this reason, we suggest that the interpretation of 
results from the probit model in Appendix A should be simply interpreted as the effect that 
treatments have on individual probability to enjoy the competition. Even if regression outcomes 
remains hard to interpret, we add this Appendix to show that also changing the dependent variable, 
the main factor influencing students’ participation is the adopted selection criterion. From the same 
regression it emerges that there is a positive and significant gender gap in participation in favor of 






5.2. Treatments’ Effect on Score 
Interventions with monetary incentives in our experiment seem not to have significantly affected 
participation at the Math Olympiad, neither at school nor at individual level. As we have argued, 
the way in which participants are selected in involved schools indicates that there was little room 
for treatments to have any significant effect. In this paragraph we investigate the effect that the No 
Gender and the Gender treatment had on the second outcome variable: individual scores. We 
include in our regression model (OLS) all control variables at our disposal, as in the previous 
Section. In Table 6 we include in the analyzed sample the Baseline, the Gender and the No Gender 
groups, where the first one is the base category of the treatment variable. Since from now on we 
analyze individual scores, we include in the set of controls also dummies for the attended class 
(i.e., year of the course that goes from 1 to 5). It is important to consider the attended class for two 
reasons: first, the Math Olympiad test is different for the first two years (and normalizing individual 
Table 6. Treatment Effect on Score 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Normalized Score OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 






































































Class Dummies 1 Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Track Dummies  No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Location 2 No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Info on School 3 No No Yes Yes Yes 
Participation 4 No No No Yes Yes 
Selection No No No Yes Yes 
Matriculation Rates 5 No No No No Yes 
Stem Choice 5 No No No No Yes 
Observations 6048 5094 5094 5094 5076 
R2 0.073 0.137 0.138 0.165 0.167 
1. Dummies for Years of the course (1 to 5). ; 
2. Includes regional dummies and the number of inhabitants of the city where the school is located. 
3. Includes the number of females and the total number of students in school; 
4. Includes the percentage of participants in school with respect to the total number of students and the percentage of females with respect 
to the total number of participants in school; 
5. Track Specific variables defined by gender (included both for males and females); 
Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors adjusted for 27 clusters in school.  





scores could not be enough to make scores comparable across students attending different classes); 
second, the attended class influences participants’ preparedness in math topics (it also includes the 
information “age” that we do not add in the set of controls to avoid collinearity). As underlined in 
the previous Section, we include in our controls both the number of participants in the school and 
the selection criterion adopted. We control also for the percentage of female participants since the 
selection criteria could have an heterogenous effects across genders (and simply because schools 
significantly differ in the number of female participants). In columns (4) and (5), where we control 
first for selection and participation and then for track-specific past performance, the coefficients of 
the treatment variable are negative and significant. This evidence suggests that monetary incentives 
had a negative impact on individuals performance. We will come back on this evidence in Section 
5.3 questioning the effective comparability of the treatment groups with the control one. As evident 
from the Chapter 4, the gender gap in performance is negative and significant (coefficient of the 
dummy female). Being female has almost the same effect, in magnitude, of our interventions. The 
coefficient of the FGA Index, as expected, is positive: the higher the quality of the school the better 
are individual performance. As you can see in our Table, we have interacted the treatment variable 
with the dummy “female” to investigate any gender-specific effect of our treatments. In Chapter 2 
we have shown that in the past literature there is evidence of heterogenous effect across genders of 
single-gender competitions. This gender-specific effect is captured from these interactions. Neither 
the No Gender nor the Gender treatment has a significant impact on females’ Olympiad scores. 
This evidence is in line with the one found in Chapter 4 when looking at the cross-groups difference 
in mean performance.  
The peculiarity of our intervention (a quota on the top) suggests that the treatments potentially have 
a significant effect on students in the upper tail of the ability distribution as they represent the 
portion of students that can more reasonably expect to get the compensation. In order to investigate 
these effects, in next regressions we separately compare first the No Gender and then the Gender 
group with the Baseline. In this regressions we include a dummy “Top10” that takes 1 if the student 
is in the top ten of the school-level ability distribution (based on the Raven Test Scores) among 
those who filled the survey. Exploiting this information we restrict the analysis to the “matched 
group”. It is necessary because among students that did not fill the survey there could be potential 
top-ability pupils that we cannot compare due to this missing information. In Table 7 we report 
results of the comparison between the No Gender and the Baseline group. The dependent variable 




Table 7. Treatment Effect (Comparison Baseline – No Gender) on Score of Top 10 at School Level 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 





























































































Class Dummies 1 Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Track Dummies  No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Location 2 No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Info on School 3 No No Yes Yes Yes 
Participation 4 No No No Yes Yes 
Selection No No No Yes Yes 
Matriculation Rates 5 No No No No Yes 
Stem Choice 5 No No No No Yes 
Observations 4747 1666 1666 1666 1666 
R2 0.062 0.206 0.215 0.223 0.233 
1. Dummies for each Year of the course (1 to 5); 
2. Includes regional dummies and the number of inhabitants of the city where the school is located. 
3. Includes the number of females and the total number of students in school; 
4. Includes the percentage of participants in school with respect to the total number of students and the percentage of females with respect 
to the total number of participants in school; 
5. Track Specific variables defined by gender (included both for males and females); 
Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors adjusted for 18 clusters in school.  
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
“female” and the treatment variable (where we consider only the treatment “No Gender” with a 
compensation scheme that does not take into account ranked students’ gender). We finally include 
the triple interaction between the female dummy, the treatment variable and the dummy “Top10”. 
The dummy “female” still has a negative and significant coefficient in each column confirming the 
gender gap in performance, even if it is not specific of the upper tail in the ability distribution 
(coefficient of the interaction “Female # Top10” not significant). Controlling for heterogenous 
effects along the ability distribution the coefficient of the treatment variable is no longer significant, 
suggesting that the treatment did not influence all students’ scores. As expected the dummy 
“Top10” has a positive and significant effect: being an high-ability students strongly influences 
realized score in the math competition. This evidence proves that the Raven Test score, also in our 




negative effect on high-ability individuals’ scores. This means that the effect that we found in the 
previous regression is mainly located at the top of the ability distribution. Indeed, coefficients of 
the interaction “No Gender # Top10” are significant in each column. The triple interaction allows 
to understand whether the interaction between the first two variables (Female and No Gender), 
hence the gender-specific treatment effect, is present among high-skilled students (for who the 
dummy Top10 is equal to 1). The coefficient for this interaction is never significant in different 
specifications (that the differ in the number of control variables included). We do the same exercise 
in Table 19 (p.54) looking at the top 25 of the within-school ability distribution. We find almost 
the same evidence. A positive and significant coefficient of the dummy “Top25” in column (3), (4) 
and (5). Hence, being in the Top25 of the ability distribution as a positive effect on own 
performance. The negative and significant coefficient of the interaction “Female # Top25”, in pair 
with a lower coefficient for the dummy “Female” with respect to the previous table, suggests that 
the gender gap is even wider among students in the top 25. This is the main difference with the 
Table 7 since the treatment still has no effect but at the top of the ability distribution (“No Gender 
# Top25”). There is not significant gender-specific treatment effect neither in the whole sample 
(Female # No Gender) nor among top students (Female # No Gender # Top25).  
In Table 8 we compare the Baseline and the Gender group adding, as for the No Gender group in 
previous analysis, specific effects for students in the Top10. The Gender treatment is the one in 
which we expected the most significant gender-specific effect on females’ performance, in line 
with the evidence from literature that single-sex contests lower the distortion of competition on 
women’s outcomes. We have to underline that in this case females are still competing against men, 
what is gender specific are monetary incentives for top-ranked students (incentive scheme 
explained in Section 3.). Evidence from this regression is in line with the one found in the No 
Gender treatment. In this subsample the gender gap is no longer significant when including in the 
regression the whole set of controls (column 5). Neither the gap is significant among high-ability 
student (Female # Top10). Monetary incentives seem to have also in this case negative and 
significant effect on students’ performance, in particular when controlling for participation and 
selection (column 4). The negative effect is stronger for high-skilled students (Gender # Top10). 
Also in this case the effect is never gender specific along the ability distribution (see Female # 
Gender and Female # Gender # Top10), although the coefficient of the triple interaction is notable 
in magnitude. Also for the Gender group we have reported in the Section “Tables” (p.50) the same 




Table 8. Treatment Effect (Comparison Baseline - Gender) on Score of Top 10 at School Level 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 





























































































Class Dummies 1 Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Track Dummies  No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Location 2 No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Info on School 3 No No Yes Yes Yes 
Participation 4 No No No Yes Yes 
Selection No No No Yes Yes 
Matriculation Rates 5 No No No No Yes 
Stem Choice 5 No No No No Yes 
Observations 3644 1173 1173 1173 1173 
R2 0.076 0.277 0.287 0.293 0.302 
1. Dummies for each Year of the course (1 to 5); 
2. Includes regional dummies and the number of inhabitants of the city where the school is located. 
3. Includes the number of females and the total number of students in school; 
4. Includes the percentage of participants in school with respect to the total number of students and the percentage of females with respect 
to the total number of participants in school; 
5. Track Specific variables defined by gender (included both for males and females); 
Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors adjusted for 15 clusters in school.  
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
difference is the significant gender gap among high-skilled students, the same we found when 
considering top 10 and top 25 students in the No Gender group. 
5.3. Control the Control Group 
The evidence that we found investigating the effect of monetary incentives on students’ outcomes 
at the Math Olympiad is in some way counterintuitive. Indeed, prizes seem to negatively affect 
both males’ and females’ performance with no gender-specific effects. This evidence holds when 
comparing the Baseline group both with the No Gender and the Gender group. The fact that these 
two treatments, even if different in the compensation scheme, have the same significant effect 
(equal across genders and more relevant for top students when considering either the top 10% or 




possible explanation could be that teenagers feel high pressure when competing for these prizes 
reacting with lower performance. Still this explanation results to be counterintuitive. In this Section 
we provide another explanation for this finding. 
Until now we have compared together all three groups to understand whether they are homogenous 
in terms of characteristics.  We have noticed that they are not perfectly balanced. Thanks to the 
regression approach we have controlled for differences across groups. Here we argue that the 
regression approach, even if rich in terms of control variables, could not efficiently investigate 
treatment effects when groups are not compatible. In our dataset we have a large set of variables, 
here we report the ones that, in our opinion, cause the argued incompatibility across groups. In 
Chapter 4 we used the Kruskal Wallis Test to test the hypothesis that all three groups are, at the 
same time, not significantly different in means (of considered variables). The main drawback of 
this type of randomization check is that it says nothing about the pair comparison across 
subsamples. In Table 9 below we report the pair comparison (for example B-NG compares means 
of the No Gender and the Baseline group) with a T-Test where the null hypothesis is that means 
are equal across groups (it is a clustered T-Test in the bottom panel were we compare individual 
data, the clusters are the schools). In the top Panel it is clear that the Gender group and the Baseline 
have significantly different participation rates. This is true for the subsample of females (p = 
0.0036), of males (p = 0.0067) and entire schools (p = 0.0009). In Section 5.1 we have shown that 
treatments had no room to influence participation both at school and individual level and that the 
selection criterion adopted within schools is the most relevant factor determining participation at 
the Math Olympiad, at least in our sample. In Figure 2 (p. 31) you can notice that more than the 
85% of schools included in the control group use the “mandatory” criterion. In none of them 
students are free to choose whether to enter the competition. This makes impossible the 
comparison, for example, across groups in which participation is always free. As we have argued, 
selection criteria can capture other school characteristics other than define the quality of students 
participating at the competition. Not surprisingly, the noted different in the distribution of schools 
among selection criteria here reflects (in Table 9) in a significantly different participation across 
groups, being much higher in the Baseline. In particular, the Gender group is very different from 
the control one. Also the No Gender group results to be different from the Baseline when 
considering within group averages of participation rates both for females (p = 0.0266) and the entire 




Table 9 . Comparison of samples  






     B–NG B-G NG-G 
       
SAMPLE WITH SCORES c - 
PARTICIPATION e 
      
Average number of female participants in 
school  
145 (48%) 98 (43%) 57 (41%) 0.2562 0.0175 0.1549 
Average number of participants in school  316 219 144 0.2652 0.0183 0.2370 
Female participants vs Females in school  34% 19% 14% 0.0266 0.0036 0.3370 
Male participants vs Males in school  40% 28% 22% 0.2297 0.0067 0.5065 
Participants in school vs Students in school  36% 22% 17% 0.0495 0.0009 0.4272 
       
MATCHED DATA WITH SURVEY d       
       
TOP b 10       
Olympiad Score (Average) 46.92 36.64 40.23 0.0411 0.1685 0.3010 
     Olympiad Score Females (Average) 41.30 32.33 37.54 0.0572 0.4674 0.0849 
     Olympiad Score Males (Average) 52.64 41.96 42.21 0.0368 0.0381 0.9506 
       
B : Baseline, NG : No Gender, G: Gender. 
a. When comparing Olympiad Score it is a T-Test for clustered data. Clusters: Schools.  
b. Top students are defined based on their Raven Test Score in the Survey. In particular they belong to the top X if their score is above 
the top X threshold (100 - X percentile) of the score distribution at school level. The distribution includes all scores of students that 
filled out the questionnaire. 
c. The subsample includes all participants at the Math Olympiad. 
d. The subsample includes Olympiad participants that filled out the questionnaire. The potential respondents were randomly selected 
e. Observations are single schools. 
 
can notice that the two treatment groups with  monetary  incentives  are  very  similar  and  within  
group  averages  are  never  significantly different for every considered variable (or subsample). 
The control group is, in our opinion, not comparable to the others because of the missing variability 
of selection criteria in favor of the mandatory participation. Selection criteria have an effect on 
performance per se, but influence also participation at school and individual level. 
 
5.4. The “Gender” Effect 
In this Section we compare the two homogenous groups: No Gender and Gender group. Indeed, 
for reasons explained in the previous Section, we think it is reasonable to take away the control 
group that seems to be very different from these two. Here we want to investigate whether the 
single-sex competition for monetary compensations can foster students’ and, in particular, females’ 
performance. Also in this case we exploit the set of control variables seen in previous regressions. 
In Table 10 we report the regression outcomes in which we include five regressions that differ in 
the number of controls. Examining the effect of splitting prizes among genders, we want still to 
understand whether there was an heterogenous effect along the ability distribution and then include 
the dummy “Top10” letting it to interact both with the treatment variable and the dummy “female”. 




Table 10. Treatment Effect (Comparison No Gender - Gender) on Score of Top 10 at School Level 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 





























































































Class Dummies 1 Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Track Dummies  No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Location 2 No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Info on School 3 No No Yes Yes Yes 
Participation 4 No No No Yes Yes 
Selection  No No No Yes Yes 
Matriculation Rates 5 No No No No Yes 
Stem Choice 5 No No No No Yes 
Observations 3705 1763 1763 1763 1763 
R2 0.092 0.207 0.209 0.223 0.230 
1. Dummies for each Year of the course (1 to 5); 
2. Includes regional dummies and the number of inhabitants of the city where the school is located. 
3. Includes the number of females and the total number of students in school; 
4. Includes the percentage of participants in school with respect to the total number of students and the percentage of females with respect 
to the total number of participants in school; 
5. Track Specific variables defined by gender (included both for males and females); 
Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors adjusted for 19 clusters in school.  
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
effect among top-skilled students. We here show only the regressions that investigate the treatment 
effect on top ten students’ performance, since there is not remarkable evidence for the top 25. Still, 
we control for participation and selection criteria. The “Female” dummy’s coefficient is negative 
and significant in each regression, showing also in this case that there is a strong realized gender 
gap in performance. The Gender treatment seems to have a positive and significant effect on 
performance (columns (2), (3) and (5)) although it has no gender specific effect on females (see 
interaction “Female # Gender”). The standardized measure of school quality (FGA index) has not 
significant effect when including all controls and, however, the effect is weak in magnitude in all 
columns. Differently from the regressions in previous paragraphs but in line with the reported 
literature, the gender gap in performance is stronger and significant at the top of the ability 




present among top students (coefficients of the interaction “Gender # Top10” are never significant). 
The main interaction (triple interaction “Female # Gender # Top10”) allows to understand whether 
our intervention had the desired effect in narrowing the gender gap in performance fostering high 
ability females’ relative performance. As noted above, the Gender treatment had an overall positive 
effect on students’ performance with no gender-specific effect. The latter effect is significant and 
robust to the introduction of all controls. This may suggest that all students may prefer to perform 
against same-gender competitors. However, when looking at top students we notice that among 
these participants the effect is heterogenous across genders. The triple interaction has positive and 
significant coefficients in column (4) and (5). The gender-based reward has a significant effect in 
narrowing the gender gap in performance among students in the top ten improving females’ 
performance. This is clear also from the fact that the interaction Female # Top10 is lower when 
introducing together the triple interaction and controls for selection and participation. Taking away 
the control group, that we have shown to be not comparable to the other ones, we finally find 
evidence of a significant effect of our policy intervention, that efficiently improved women’s 






















6. Final Discussion 
We have analyzed the effect of two policy interventions in a field experiment. In randomly selected 
schools we introduced monetary compensations for top-ranked students in the Math Olympiad’s 
competition. The purpose of these two interventions was to analyze the effect that different 
treatments can have in fostering females’ participation and improving their performance in a 
stereotyped-male task trying to manipulate the distortion of competition widely discussed in past 
literature. In particular, the No Gender treatment allowed us to investigate and isolate the effect of 
monetary incentives on students’ outcomes, while the Gender treatment was intended to examine 
whether gender-based rewards could have heterogenous effects across genders giving the 
opportunity to women to narrow or close the gap with their male peers. We also investigated 
whether these interventions had a remarkable effect on high-ability students since top-performing 
females seem to be those who mostly fail to enter and well-perform in competitive contexts. The 
latter evidence clearly is an economic (and equity) matter. Exploiting data about a subsample where 
there was no policy intervention, we had the possibility to examine policy effects comparing 
treatment groups with an “absent the action” scenario. Monetary prizes had no effects on 
participation neither at school nor at individual level. Unfortunately the participation was mostly 
driven by other factors, giving small room to incentive schemes to change students’ entry decision. 
Our data suggest that when looking at individual scores, ceteris paribus, monetary incentives had 
a negative and significant effect on students’ performance with no gender-specific effect. In Section 
5.3 we have argued that these results can be hardly driven by the control group being not 
comparable with the treatment ones. The missing variability in selection criteria and the scrupulous 
selection of participants in schools randomly included in the Baseline group make this subsample 
very special. Even without isolating the effect of monetary incentives per se we compared the No 
Gender and the Gender group to understand whether the introduction of a single-sex competition 
for monetary prizes had any remarkable effect on females’ relative performance. The Gender 
treatment had the desired effect in particular on performance of females in the top ten of the school-
level ability distributions. This findings are in line with the literature showing that females may 
prefer same-gender competitions. We think that results from this experiment, due to the peculiarity 
of the designed treatments, give us other suggestions. Monetary incentives were different across 
subsamples. In the No Gender group students had to overperform the entire pool of participants in 
order to get the reward. In the Gender group, instead, participants had to overperform only peers 




compensation, the math Olympiad remained a mixed-gender competition. In the real world it is 
hard to imagine quotas in some contexts (e.g., entry exams, recruiting) and making females to 
compete only against individuals of the same gender could be not applicable. We suggest that 
gender-based rewards (even if nonmonetary) could potentially foster women’s performance also 





















Table 11. Variables by Treatment 
 Baseline No gender Gender K-Wallis c 
(p-value) 
SAMPLE WITH SURVEY d     
     
INFO ON SCHOOLS e     
Number of participating schools 8 11 10  
Average number of females in school 495 (53%) 547 (51%) 464 (51%) 0.8680 
Average number of students in school 922 1060 935 0.7484 
Average number of tracks per school 3.87 3.73 4.2 0.6587 
Track Specific b :     
     Females' Matriculation Rate (University) 86% 89% 82% 0.0836 
     Males' Matriculation Rate (University) 85% 86% 81% 0.5873 
     Females choosing STEM fields 48% 49% 41% 0.2805 
     Males choosing STEM fields 64% 59% 61% 0.9786 
     FGA Index 68.44 71.43 68.44 0.2765 
     
INFO ON STUDENTS     
     
ENTIRE SAMPLE d     
Number of participating students 1597 2369 2864  
     Males 709 (44.4%) 1007 (42.5%) 1463 (51.1%)  
     Females 888 (55.6%) 1362 (57.5%) 1401 (48.9%)  
Raven Test Score (Average) 4.99 (1.66) 4.89 (1.75) 4.80 (1.73) 0.6719 
     Raven Test Score Females (Average) 4.86 (1.66) 4.92 (1.70) 4.80 (1.70) 0.8457 
     Raven Test Score Males (Average) 5.17  (1.65) 4.84 (1.82) 4.80  (1.76) 0.1862 
TOP a 10     
Number of students in the Top10 303 380 502  
     Males 147 (48.5%) 159 (41.8%) 271 (54%)  
     Females 156 (51.5%) 221 (58.2%) 231 (46%)  
Raven Test Score (Average) 7.31 (0.65) 7.24 (0.87) 7.38 (0.63) 0.6884 
     Raven Test Score Females (Average) 7.24 (0.64) 7.14 (0.84) 7.39 (0.64) 0.3184 
     Raven Test Score Males (Average) 7.39 (0.66) 7.39 (0.89) 7.38 (0.62) 0.9951 
TOP a 25     
Number of students in the Top25 654 806 1167  
     Males 310 (47.4%) 330 (40.9%) 601 (51.5%)  
     Females 344 (52.6%) 476 (59.1%) 566 (48.5%)  
Raven Test Score (Average) 6.58 (0.86) 6.63 (1.00) 6.38 (1.07) 0.6798 
     Raven Test Score Females (Average) 6.50 (0.87) 6.56 (0.96) 6.36 (1.05) 0.7712 
     Raven Test Score Males (Average) 6.67 (0.84) 6.73 (1.06) 6.41 (1.09) 0.5137 
TOP a 50     
Number of students in the Top50 1039 1463 1850  
     Males 477 (45.9%) 590 (40.3%) 928 (50.2%)  
     Females 562 (54.1%) 873 (59.7%) 922 (49.8%)  
Raven Test Score (Average) 5.95 (1.08) 5.91 (1.20) 5.75 (1.24) 0.6936 
     Raven Test Score Females (Average) 5.85 (1.09) 5.85 (1.18) 5.71 (1.22) 0.8048 
     Raven Test Score Males (Average) 6.08 (1.07) 6.01 (1.23) 5.79 (1.27) 0.4830 
Percentages and standard deviations in parentheses.  
a. Top students are defined based on their Raven Test Score in the Survey. In particular they belong to the top X if their score is above 
the top X threshold (100 - X percentile) of the score distribution at school level. The distribution includes all scores of students that 
filled out the questionnaire. 
b. These data refer to single tracks within each school and come from Fondazione Agnelli. Data are not available for every track but 
almost the entire sample is covered. 
c. The null hypothesis is that means are equal across samples (i.e. samples belong to the same population).When comparing Track-
Specific data and Raven Test Scores it is a Kruskal-Wallis test for clustered data. Clusters: Schools. 
d. The sample includes all individuals that filled out the questionnaire irrespectively from participation in the Olympiad. 









Table 12. Variables by Treatment     
 Baseline No gender Gender K-Wallis e 
(p-value) 
MATCHED DATA WITH SURVEY d     
     
INFO ON SCHOOLS     
Number of participating schools 7 11 9  
Average number of females in school 495 (52%) 547 (51%) 464 (51%) 0.8576 
Average number of students in school 938 1060 935 0.8132 
Average number of tracks per school 3.57 3.73 4.4 0.2938 
Track Specific c:      
     Females' Matriculation Rate (University) 84% 89% 82% 0.0783 
     Males' Matriculation Rate (University) 84% 86% 81% 0.7109 
     Females choosing STEM fields 53% 48% 41% 0.1860 
     Males choosing STEM fields 66% 59% 61% 0.9104 
     FGA Index 67.84 71.87 68.44 0.3199 
     
INFO ON STUDENTS     
Total Matched Individuals 621 1170 757  
     Males 309 (49.7%) 526 (45%) 433 (57.2%)  
     Females 312 (50.3%) 644 (55%) 324 (42.8%)  
Olympiads selection criteria a: 
     Free 
 






     Suggested 22 (3.5%) 241 (20.6%) 134 (17.7%)  
     Mandatory 599 (96.5%) 877 (75%) 391 (51.7%)  
Raven Test Score (Average) 5.01 (1.62) 5.30 (1.68) 5.11 (1.71) 0.2558 
     Raven Test Score Females (Average) 4.90 (1.62) 5.35 (1.58) 5.14 (1.68) 0.1178 
     Raven Test Score Males (Average) 5.13 (1.61) 5.23 (1.79) 5.08 (1.72) 0.8130 
Olympiad Score (Average) 34.95 (18.02) 31.57 (14.20) 33.22 (15.21) 0.6518 
     Olympiad Score Females (Average) 31.07 (15.78) 29.75 (12.74) 30.58 (13.39) 0.9695 
     Olympiad Score Males (Average) 38.86 (19.28) 33.80 (15.53) 35.19 (16.18) 0.4494 
TOP b 10     
Number of students in the Top10 113 219 158  
     Males 56 (49.6%) 98 (44.7%) 91 (57.6%)  
     Females 57 (50.4%) 121 (55.3%) 67 (42.4%)  
Raven Test Score (Average) 7.34 (0.65) 7.53 (0.77) 7.51 (0.65) 0.5263 
     Raven Test Score Females (Average) 7.18 (0.57) 7.43 (0.72) 7.55 (0.68) 0.1228 
     Raven Test Score Males (Average) 7.50 (0.69) 7.64 (0.83) 7.48 (0.62) 0.7529 
Olympiad Score (Average) 46.92 (20.86) 36.64 (15.57) 40.23 (16.33) 0.1654 
     Olympiad Score Females (Average) 41.30 (19.41) 32.33 (13.53) 37.54 (15.41) 0.1502 
     Olympiad Score Males (Average) 52.64 (20.89) 41.96 (16.32) 42.21 (16.78) 0.2141 
TOP b 25     
Number of students in the Top25 247 420 315  
     Males 126 (51%) 180 (42.9%) 184 (57.7%)  
     Females 121 (49%) 240 (57.1%) 135 (42.3%)  
Raven Test Score (Average) 6.60 (0.86) 6.99 (0.90) 6.69 (0.96) 0.1862 
     Raven Test Score Females (Average) 6.51 (0.83) 6.88 (0.86) 6.72 (0.98) 0.3521 
     Raven Test Score Males (Average) 6.68 (0.89) 7.12 (0.93) 6.67 (0.94) 0.0775 
Olympiad Score (Average) 40.98 (20.54) 34.94 (14.76) 37.05 (15.92) 0.4202 
     Olympiad Score Females (Average) 35.96 (18.19) 31.95 (12.72) 33.59 (14.27) 0.6970 
     Olympiad Score Males (Average) 45.81 (21.55) 38.93 (16.30) 39.59 (16.61) 0.3848 
TOP b 50     
Number of students in the Top50 407 759 519  
     Males 207 (50.9%) 322 (42.4%) 282 (54.3%)  
     Females 200 (49.1%) 437 (57.6%) 228 (45.7%)  
Raven Test Score (Average) 5.94 (1.08) 6.26 (1.12) 6.01 (1.18) 0.1337 
     Raven Test Score Females (Average) 5.85 (1.07) 6.19 (1.08) 5.95 (1.22) 0.1291 
     Raven Test Score Males (Average) 6.02 (1.08) 6.35 (1.18) 6.06 (1.15) 0.1904 
Olympiad Score (Average) 37.74 (18.93) 33.29 (14.65) 35.05 (15.54) 0.5405 
     Olympiad Score Females (Average) 33.74 (16.58) 30.90 (13.24) 31.97 (13.48) 0.8205 
     Olympiad Score Males (Average) 41.61 (20.25) 36.54 (15.83) 37.54 (16.63) 0.5553 
     
Percentages and standard deviations in parentheses. 




“Free”). On the other hand participants can be chosen by professors (“Suggested”) that invite best students to participate, or it can be 
that some classes or best students are forced to participate based on merits or other characteristics (“Mandatory”). Also these two 
criteria in some cases could imply that not invited or forced students can join the competition but it is likely to be rare. 
b. Top students are defined based on their Raven Test Score in the Survey. In particular they belong to the top X if their score is above 
the top X threshold (100 - X percentile) of the score distribution at school level. The distribution includes all scores of students that 
filled out the questionnaire. 
c. These data refer to single tracks within each school and come from Fondazione Agnelli. Data are not available for every track but 
almost the entire sample is covered. Numbers are within sample averages.  
d. The subsample includes Olympiad participants that filled out the questionnaire. The potential respondents were randomly selected. 
e. The null hypothesis is that means are equal across samples (i.e. samples belong to the same population. When comparing Track-




Table 13. Difference in Olympiad Scores – Sample with scores 











Score c Entire b  3512 2548 31.70   32.88    0.5994 
Score c Entire b Females 1384 1280 30 30.28 0.9010 
Score c Entire b Males 2128 1268 32.79 35.51 0.3011 
Score c Baseline  1723 621 31.66 34.95 0.4708 
Score c Baseline Females 751 312 30.37 31.07 0.8841 
Score c Baseline Males 972 309 32.66 38.86 0.2890 
Score c No Gender  1234 1170 32.38 31.57 0.8503 
Score c No Gender Females 430 644 29.98 29.75 0.9491 
Score c No Gender Males 804 526 33.66 33.80 0.9788 
Score c Gender  545 757 30.22 33.22 0.4574 
Score c Gender Females 196 324 28.55 30.58 0.6913 
Score c Gender Males 349 433 31.15 35.20 0.4852 
a. T-Test for clustered data. Clusters: Schools.  
b. Includes the whole sample with Scores independently on the treatment.  
c. Normalized score. 
 
 
Table 14. Difference in Raven Test Scores – Sample with survey 











Raven Score Entire b  4282 2584       4.70     5.17    0.0459 
Raven Score Entire b Females 2371 1280 4.68 5.20 0.0245 
Raven Score Entire b Males 1911 1268 4.72 5.15 0.0547 
Raven Score Top 10%  695 490 7.21 7.48 0.1903 
Raven Score Top 10% Females 363 245 7.16 7.40 0.2439 
Raven Score Top 10% Males 332 245 7.26 7.55 0.1769 
Raven Score Top 25%  1641 986 6.34 6.80 0.0813 
Raven Score Top 25% Females 890 496 6.30 6.75 0.0849 
Raven Score Top 25% Males 751 490 6.38 6.84 0.0842 
Raven Score Top 50%  2676 1676 5.70 6.10 0.0743 
Raven Score Top 50% Females 1492 865 5.65 6.05 0.0946 
Raven Score Top 50% Males 1184 811 5.76 6.17 0.1169 
a. T-Test for clustered data. Clusters: Schools.  








Table 15. Distribution of Students Among Treatments by Region 
  Baseline No gender Gender Total 
Veneto  825 (35.2%) 1066 (44.3%) 474 (36,4%) 2365 
Emilia Romagna  491 (21%)  859 (35.7%) 429 (33%) 1779 
Friuli-Venezia Giulia  1028 (43.8%) 479 (20%) 154 (11.8%) 1661 
Trentino - Alto Adige  0 0 245 (18.8%) 245 
Total  2344 2404 1302 6050 
 
 
Table 16. Distribution of Participants Among Treatments by Track 
 Baseline No gender Gender Total 
Altro 48 0 0 48 
Istituto Professionale 0 15 0 15 
Istituto Tecnico 244 184 255 683 
Liceo Artistico 0 0 10 10 
Liceo Classico 72 205 45 322 
Liceo Linguistico 2 23 26 51 
Liceo Musicale 109 0 0 109 
Liceo Scientifico 619 1296 360 2275 
Liceo Scientifico - Indirizzo Sportivo 334 0 25 359 
Liceo Scientifico - Scienze Applicate 607 626 546 1779 
Liceo Scienze Umane 212 34 29 275 
Liceo Scienze Umane - Economico Sociale 71 21 6 98 
Total 2318 2404 1302 6024 
Pearson  P = 0.000     
 
 
Table 17. Distribution of Participants Among Gender Types by Track 
 Male Female Total 
Altro 29 19 48 
Istituto Professionale 7 8 15 
Istituto Tecnico 518 165 683 
Liceo Artistico 5 5 10 
Liceo Classico 85 237 322 
Liceo Linguistico 12 39 51 
Liceo Musicale 64 45 109 
Liceo Scientifico 1136 1139 2275 
Liceo Scientifico - Indirizzo Sportivo 221 138 359 
Liceo Scientifico - Scienze Applicate 1234 545 1779 
Liceo Scienze Umane 28 247 275 
Liceo Scienze Umane - Economico Sociale 39 59 98 
Total 3378 2646 6024 







Table 18. Distribution of Schools Among Selection Criteria - Treatment 
 Baseline No gender Gender Total 
Free 0 2 4 6 
Suggested 1 5 2 8 
Mandatory 6 4 3 13 
Total 7 11 9 27 
Fisher's exact =  0.134     
 
 
Table 19. Treatment Effect (Comparison Baseline – No Gender) on Score of Top 25 at School Level 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 





























































































Class Dummies 1 Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Track Dummies  No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Location 2 No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Info on School 3 No No Yes Yes Yes 
Participation 4 No No No Yes Yes 
Selection No No No Yes Yes 
Matriculation Rates 5 No No No No Yes 
Stem Choice 5 No No No No Yes 
Observations 4747 1666 1666 1666 1666 
R2 0.062 0.202 0.206 0.214 0.223 
1. Dummies for each Year of the course (1 to 5); 
2. Includes regional dummies and the number of inhabitants of the city where the school is located. 
3. Includes the number of females and the total number of students in school; 
4. Includes the percentage of participants in school with respect to the total number of students and the percentage of females with respect 
to the total number of participants in school; 
5. Track Specific variables defined by gender (included both for males and females); 
Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors adjusted for 18 clusters in school.  







Table 20. Treatment Effect (Comparison Baseline - Gender) on Score of Top 25 at School Level 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 





























































































Class Dummies 1 Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Track Dummies  No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Location 2 No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Info on School 3 No No Yes Yes Yes 
Participation 4 No No No Yes Yes 
Selection No No No Yes Yes 
Matriculation Rates 5 No No No No Yes 
Stem Choice 5 No No No No Yes 
Observations 3644 1173 1173 1173 1173 
R2 0.076 0.267 0.274 0.280 0.288 
1. Dummies for each Year of the course (1 to 5); 
2. Includes regional dummies and the number of inhabitants of the city where the school is located. 
3. Includes the number of females and the total number of students in school; 
4. Includes the percentage of participants in school with respect to the total number of students and the percentage of females with respect 
to the total number of participants in school; 
5. Track Specific variables defined by gender (included both for males and females); 
Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors adjusted for 15 clusters in school.  












Appendix A: Individual Participation  
Probit Model - Treatment effect on individual participation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Participation 1 Probit7 Probit7 Probit7 Probit7 Probit7 
















































































Class Dummies 4 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Track Dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Matriculation Rates 5 No No No Yes Yes 
Stem Choice 5 No No No Yes Yes 
Location 6 No No No No Yes 
Observations 10342 8447 8447 8391 8391 
Pseudo R2 0.112 0.261 0.261 0.269 0.282 
1. The dependent variable is a dummy for participation equal to 1 if the student enjoined the competition.  
2. Base Category : Control group “Baseline”; 
3. Base Category : “Free”; 
4. Dummies for each Year of the course (1 to 5); 
5. Track Specific variables defined by gender (included both for males and females); 
6. Includes regional dummies and the number of inhabitants of the city where the school is located. 
7. Marginal effects are reported. 
Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors adjusted for 27 clusters in school. 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
In this Appendix we want to show the also at individual level the treatments with monetary 
incentives had no effect on students’ probability to enter the competition. In the Table above we 
show results of the probit regression where the dependent variable is a dummy that takes 1 if the 
student participated at the Math Olympiad, 0 otherwise. Although the No Gender treatment has a 
positive and significant effect on individual participation in column (2), (3) and (4), the coefficient 
is not significant in the last column (where we add the full set of controls) for neither of the 
treatments. The negative and significant coefficient of the dummy “female” shows that the gender 
gap is present also when considering participation. The school quality is still negatively related to 
the probability to participate, here we confirm what we argued in Section 5.1. Finally, also in these 
regressions the selection criterion adopted within the attended school results to be the most relevant 
factor. Since our interventions needed the “free” participation in order to change individual 
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